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
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The four major articles of this January issue usher in a year of rich classical associations. Our two guests of honor have had different fortunes. Versatile Cicero has steadily been in the center of attention, whereas Ovid has at times seemed dispensable. However, his brilliance is receiving fresh luster currently from much prominence in books, translations, articles, and dissertations. This reawakening was sensed two decades ago by T. F. Higham who wrote in *The Classical Review* 48 (1934) 105 and 106: "Ovid died, for at least the third time, in the nineteenth century. . . . There are signs that Ovid is reviving, which can only mean that the blows of his critics fell somehow wide of the mark."

Cicero and the Literary Dialogue

PHILIP LEVINE

IN THE LONG COURSE of his posthumous career Cicero has very frequently been caught in a cross-fire of criticism: historians have often blamed him for offering too much of himself and too little of others in his public orations, and philosophers have just as often blamed him for offering too little of himself and too much of others in his philosophic writings. And when in his letters he reveals himself for what he really was, a human being with very human foibles and inconsistencies, he has been condemned for that too.

Now I am not suggesting that Cicero has never been justly appreciated also by others than himself, nor is it my intention here to attempt a rehabilitation of his reputation. What I propose to do is to discuss briefly certain aspects of his original contribution in an important category of his writing, where, owing to the nature of the subject matter, it has not always received the recognition that it deserves. I refer to his literary dialogues.¹

It has long been a favorite pursuit or pastime among many Ciceronian scholars to attempt to unravel the results of his "contamination" in his philosophic works. Such dissecting studies have, of course, a certain value when the conclusions are not controversial—which, incidentally, is not always the case. But this value, even when it does exist, lies not so much in an increase of our understanding of Cicero's own achievement as in an increase of our knowledge of some dark chapters in the history of ancient philosophic thought, notably Hellenistic and Roman developments of the classical Greek heritage. This exclusive emphasis on sources is grossly unfair to Cicero as a literary figure. For the area

in which he could best give expression to his native talent and originality is to be found not in the concepts and notions which he admittedly derived from the Greeks but in the literary dress with which he clothed the philosophic discussions where these borrowed ideas are presented. Cicero neither has nor makes any claim to being an "original" thinker.

The literary dialogue provided Cicero with the necessary instrument to propagate Greek thought among his fellow-citizens, and, though this was itself a Greek creation, it became in his hands a highly effective means to Romanize foreign material sufficiently to satisfy domestic standards of propriety that obtained in the case of intellectual pursuits. Cicero well realized that to the average Roman philosophic speculation in itself was a rather undignified, not to say suspect, activity of Hellenizing eggheads² and that it could only be made palatable if it was presented in a respectable Roman setting. This awareness of a national prejudice left its mark on several important aspects of his dialogue technique, and, as I shall show, provides a key to the explanation or, at least, understanding of certain problems of composition in some of his extant philosophic writings.

In the second book of his *De Oratore* Cicero put into the mouth of Crassus, who was obviously the spokesman of his own sentiments, a sharply worded and characteristically Roman criticism of a common type of indiscriminate among the Greeks when it came to philosophic discussions (2. 18):

Omnium autem ineptiarum, quae sunt innumerabiles, haud sciam an nulla sit maior quam, ut illi solent, quocumque in loco,

quoscumque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non necessariis argutissime disputare.

The several implications of this charge are clear enough, and they constitute, in fact, guiding principles that Cicero carefully observed in the dramatic construction of his dialogues.

Thus, in his representation of the *mise en scène*, Cicero often exercised special care to indicate that the discussions of which he gave an account occurred under circumstances which did not interfere with the fulfillment of public duties and obligations by the participating speakers. A good illustration of this technique is found in the *De Republica* and the *De Natura Deorum*, for they are both described as taking place on the *feriae Latinae*, when public business was suspended.³ This choice of a holiday for a philosophic discussion was no mere accident. From a letter to Quintus we learn that the original plan of the former dialogue, which was somewhat different from that of the extant version, also placed the dramatic occasion on a holiday, the *novendiales feriae* of the year 129 B.C.⁴ Similarly, the requisite leisure for the talks in the *De Oratore* was provided by the *Ludi Romani*,⁵ and the conversations in the *De Legibus* occupy one long summer day.⁶ The motivation for the characteristic attitude here reflected springs from the same origin as that which prompted Cicero to make the famous apology in the *Pro Archia* for his own literary pursuits (13):

Qua re quis tandem me reprehendat, aut quis mihi iure suscenseat, si, quantum ceteris ad suas res obeundas, quantum ad festos dies ludorum celebrandos, quantum ad alias voluptates et ad ipsam requiem animi et corporis conceditur temporum, quantum alii tribuunt tempestivis conviviis, quantum denique alveolo, quantum pilae, tantum mihi egomet ad haec studia recolenda sumpsero?

In other words, intellectual activities can only claim such leisure time as remains after the performance of official responsibilities.

However, Cicero knew that it did not suffice to provide merely an appropriate occasion for a philosophic parley. He was also keenly conscious of the necessity to have the right sort of people participate in it. Thus, in the *De Republica*, as he wrote in a letter to his brother Quintus, the high rank of the disputants *aliquantum orationi ponderis afferebat*.⁷ Doubtless, from the conservative Roman point of view, a bare-footed stone-cutter or sculptor, who spent much of his time conversing with idlers in the market place, would have been wholly ineffective, if not downright intolerable, as principal interlocutor in a Latin dialogue on so lofty a subject as justice or the commonwealth. Equally serious is the theological theme of the *De Natura Deorum*, and, as I have pointed out elsewhere,⁸ the *auctoritas* of the Romans selected by Cicero to speak for the three Greek philosophic schools in that dialogue is very impressive. C. Aurelius Cotta, the chief Academic proponent, is introduced in the dialogue as a pontiff and known to have become consul at a later date.⁹ The Stoic representative, Q. Lucilius Balbus, is ranked by Cicero with the leading Greek exponents of that school, while Epicureanism is championed by C. Velleius, who is described both as its chief Roman adherent and, curiously enough, as a Roman senator.¹⁰ The significance of the apparent paradox in the characterization of Velleius should not be overlooked. It explains why Cicero would not have chosen Lucretius for the Epicurean role even if the dramatic date of the dialogue, which is in the mid 70's, had allowed. A person like Velleius, by virtue of his position in national life, possessed considerably more prestige in a dialogue, just as in the forum, than a retiring poet who may well have been more truly Epicurean in his mode of living.¹¹

On the other hand, from Cicero's revisions of the *Academica* we learn that public prominence was not the sole criterion which determined his choice of

the *dramatis personae*. He was also very careful to preserve a certain degree of historical or biographical verisimilitude and thus took into account personal qualifications of the individuals in his assignment of parts.¹² In the first version of this dialogue he had Q. Lutatius Catulus, L. Licinius Lucullus and Q. Hortensius Hortalus as principal speakers. But soon after the work was published in this form, Cicero began to be dubious about the selection of such men for a discussion on so abstruse a topic as epistemology, because, though they were well known national figures, yet in real life, as he himself had to admit, they had no particular training or experience in philosophic speculation. For this reason, as he tells us in several letters to Atticus, he made a revision of the dramatic scheme and transferred their roles to Cato and Brutus. Ultimately, in the third and final version of the dialogue, he introduced as exponent for the views of Antiochus the scholarly Varro who was known to have a personal preference for them.¹³ In the *De Divinatione*, it is true, Quintus is evidently miscast, since he appears as a representative of the Stoic position though he himself was actually more of a Peripatetic. Yet, this exception to Cicero's usual procedure is not so serious as it might appear at first sight, for he adroitly allowed his brother an opportunity within the dialogue itself to set the record straight as to his personal conviction on the subject of divination.¹⁴

Up to this point, I have indicated three important considerations that guided Cicero in the composition of his dialogues: appropriateness of circumstances, eminence of the principal interlocutors and historical or biographical verisimilitude. So far as the substance of the dialogue was concerned, these factors involved details that were external and therefore variable according to need or desire of the writer. But the very content or subject matter was itself a concern that also occupied his attention. This, of course,

was something internal to the dialogue and, as such, much less flexible than the other factors. Nevertheless, Cicero demonstrated here too a remarkable sensitivity to public reaction in his manipulation of the material within the frame of dialogue.

This sensitivity is well illustrated in the succession of revisions that the *De Republica* is known to have undergone. We learn from a letter to his brother that Cicero originally had chosen to follow the practice of Heraclides Ponticus by setting the dramatic date of the recorded conversations in the historical past so as to avoid the necessity of treating contemporary public issues that might stir hostile feelings.¹⁵ However, the same letter also tells us that Cicero was confronted with a dilemma because he was urged by a friend to participate in the discussion himself and thus enhance its effectiveness with the weighty authority of his own wide political experience. Indeed, at the time he wrote the letter, he had already decided to comply with his friend's suggestion and furnish the dialogue with a contemporary setting. Yet, from the extant version of the *De Republica*, it is clear that Cicero had never carried out this decision, and the dramatic date remained, as it was originally conceived, in 129 B.C. Obviously, the author had second thoughts on the personal risk involved and preferred to suppress his ego rather than to stick out his neck in a theoretical examination of the State. In the case of this work's sequel, the *De Legibus*, the problem of the dates of its composition and publication is notoriously difficult and perhaps insoluble in view of Cicero's own complete silence on the subject. Nevertheless, the author's attested caution in dealing theoretically with contemporary political affairs or institutions *sua persona* may well explain his hesitation to give this work his *imprimatur* until his very last days, if even then.¹⁶

However, if, as it now appears, Cicero was subject to a restraining sensitivity to public reaction in his dia-

logues on political matters, it might seem that he threw all his circumspection to the winds when he undertook to write his works on theology. For his *De Natura Deorum* and *De Divinatione* contain strongly critical, if not wholly destructive, arguments against the very foundations of a belief in the gods and against certain traditional rites practised by the State. Moreover, this apparent indiscretion, unless it can be properly explained and understood, might cause the modern reader all the more wonderment since Roman religion is known to have been intimately connected with political institutions. But a study of the two dialogues reveals that Cicero was well aware of the delicate problem that he had on his hands, and an examination of his procedure discloses the technique that he employed to resolve the difficulty in terms acceptable to the Roman mind.

In the *De Natura Deorum* the entire discussion of the three books occupies a single day, and Cicero himself, though present throughout, is really a *kopòn prósopon* or mute character. He speaks only a few words when he arrives on the scene and says nothing more until the end of the third book, when, as author rather than as speaker, he concludes the work with an expressed personal preference for the argumentation of the Stoic Balbus over the negative criticism of dogmatic theology by the Academic Cotta.

As I have shown in detail elsewhere,¹⁷ several difficult problems are involved here. First, though the dialogue supposedly takes place during the course of a single day, two speakers incongruously refer to previous statements as having been made on preceding days.¹⁸ Further, according to the *mise en scène*, all the conversations of the three books were held at a single spot without a break in time or change in setting. But such a dramatic structure is absolutely without parallel in all Cicero's other extant dialogues, for nowhere else does a single scene extend beyond two books. Even more puzzling

is Cicero's inconsistency about himself between the introduction and the concluding statement. In the proem he says that those who want to know his own opinion on each subject he treats are too inquisitive, and he intimates that he will suppress his private view so that his readers may not be unduly influenced in the formation of their judgments by the *auctoritas* of the writer. He would have them decide the issue solely on the basis of the arguments adduced by each side.¹⁹ But in the last sentence of the work he openly declares that he himself found greater probability in Balbus' presentation of Stoic theology.²⁰

These irregularities are ordinarily explained as the results of hasty composition. But to do so is to overlook the uniqueness of their character as compared with the type of carelessness found in Cicero's other dialogues and to fail to grasp the significance of the unusual role which the author assigned to himself in the *De Natura Deorum*. In every other dialogue in which he appears, Cicero plays a leading part in the discussion, but here he allows himself to remain dumb throughout. This unwonted silence becomes all the more remarkable if, as I have tried to demonstrate,²¹ he was already contemplating the composition of the *De Natura Deorum* when, at the end of June, 45 B.C., he wrote to Atticus a letter in which he described the kind of dialogues that he was then composing. In this epistle he told Atticus that the dialogues that he was currently writing were of the Aristotelian type, in which the speeches of the other interlocutors were introduced in such a way that the principal part rested with the author himself.²² In other words, it is not unlikely that Cicero originally planned to play a major role in the *De Natura Deorum*, although he now appears in it only as a mute Academic.

Now, let us suppose for a moment that Cicero had carried out his primary intention to hold the main Academic part for himself in the *De Natura*

Deorum. If we then consider the political implications that a person so sensitively attuned to public sentiment might, in retrospect, see for himself in a negative attitude toward dogmatic theology and the very bases of all belief in the gods, we can arrive at an adequate motive for the author to alter his plan so as to extricate himself from the awkward position of being the *advocatus diaboli*. Cicero was actually faced here with a twofold problem: he had not only to avoid compromising himself but also to make palatable to the Roman mind the Academic critique on a subject which so directly concerned a significant part of the nation's heritage. The solution was not so simple as in the case of the *De Republica*, where he had merely to revert to the original Heraclidean form of the dialogue in order to eschew reference to contemporary political issues. In the *De Natura Deorum*, Cicero, seeking to make his own stand clear in the context of the discussion, resorted to the unusual device of relegating himself to a subordinate role. In this way he was able not only to be present at the meeting and listen to all the arguments pro and con but also, as an Academic, to form an independent judgment. Thus, when, contrary to what he said in the proem, he avowed his own preference at the conclusion of the work for the Stoic's *disputatio*, he was, in fact, stating for public record that he himself favored the orthodox Roman belief in the gods. On the other hand, if he had excluded himself from the *dramatis personae* completely, as he did in the ordinary Heraclidean type, he plainly could not have vindicated his own position so effectively.

To resolve the second difficulty and prove that the skeptical philosophic attitude of the Academic protagonist was not designed to undermine traditional Roman worship, Cicero employed the extraordinary paradox of having a distinguished pontiff assume the major role. In so doing, the author was exploiting the extremely formal character

of the State religion, which required only an outward fulfillment of divine obligations. The fact that Cotta held the public office of high priest was *prima facie* evidence that he did uphold in reality the traditional rites and that his skeptical speculation was entirely theoretical and divorced from actual practice. Hypocritical as this ambivalence may appear to us, it would be acceptable to a Roman sense of propriety in such matters. In short, Cicero was of the opinion that it was safe to "let a hundred flowers blossom [and] a hundred schools of thought contend," provided that sufficient assurance could be given that the Roman system was not being endangered.

Thus, the anachronisms and irregularities in the dramatic structure of the *De Natura Deorum* and the complete reversal of intention between the proem and conclusion indicate something more than just hasty composition. They are visible signs of an imperfectly executed change in the draft of the writer's original plan. And the necessary motivation for the change is discovered through a proper understanding of the full significance both of his unparalleled self-demotion to a very minor part and of the paradox of the doubting priest.

When Cicero came to write the *De Divinatione*, which supplemented the previous dialogue, the subject matter offered the same sort of problem as before. Here the topic embraced the observance of certain rites of divination, notably augury, long associated with the Roman State, and a Stoic defense of the institution was to be followed by an Academic critique. In such a situation, it might have seemed the better part of prudence for a political author not to identify himself with the negative side. Yet, this time, interestingly enough, contrary to his procedure in the *De Natura Deorum*, Cicero confidently gave himself the role of Academic protagonist and attacked belief in the superstition on rational grounds with the merciless logic of a

veteran prosecutor. However, this action was not so rash or indiscreet as a modern reader might suppose. Cicero had created for himself a literary precedent in the figure of Cotta. Like his prototype in the *De Natura Deorum*, the author held a religious office and, by virtue of his membership in the augural college, adequately demonstrated to his fellow countrymen that, as a Roman, he loyally supported in practice the continuation of this time-honored rite, the political value of which he more than once openly acknowledged.²³ Like Cotta, too, he solemnly affirmed his personal conviction, in the very midst of his philosophic skepticism, that traditional religious beliefs and customs should be preserved.²⁴ Hence, in the *De Divinatione* Cicero once again vividly exemplified the fundamental dichotomy that prevailed in the Roman mind between philosophic theory and actual practice in matters of religion.

There existed, then, a sort of triangular relation in Cicero's dialogues among the author himself, the subject matter and the contemporary public. As this study of his procedure in composition has established, the interaction of these three factors affected the literary form of the philosophic discussion. Cicero skilfully manipulated the dramatic elements to satisfy Roman sentiments of propriety, and, when the topic was politically delicate, he took special care not to give offense. The caution that he exercised led him to withdraw himself completely from the scheme of the *De Republica* and to reduce himself to a very secondary part in the *De Natura Deorum*. Even in the *De Divinatione*, where he savagely attacked in his own person a subject that included ancestral rites of augury, he appears to have been, from a Roman point of view, on the right side of discretion. For, although he assailed this public institution in theory, he made it abundantly clear that he upheld it in practice and thus proved himself, in the

last analysis, still a good Roman. In fine, to insure the success of his dialogues among conservative, hard-headed contemporaries, Cicero had to show that philosophy and the qualities of good Roman citizenship were not incompatible.

Harvard University

NOTES

¹ This essay is a somewhat modified version of a paper that was read at the 51st Annual Meeting of C.A.N.E. at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn., on April 6, 1957, at a symposium concerning "Bimillennial Thoughts on Caesar and Cicero." A more detailed exposition of several arguments here presented is now available, as indicated below, in the author's article "The Original Design and the Publication of the *De Natura Deorum*," *HSCP* 62 (1957) 7-36.

² Cf. *Nepos apud Lactant. Div. Inst.* 3. 15. 10: *Tantum abest, ut ego magistrum esse putem vitae philosophiam beatamque vitae perfecticem, ut nullis magis existimem opus esse magistrum vivendi quam plerisque, qui in ea disputanda versantur.* This quotation is from a letter to Cicero.

³ Cf. *Rep.* 1. 14; *N. D.* 1. 15; 2. 3.

⁴ Cf. *Ad Q. Fr.* 3. 5. 1.

⁵ Cf. *De Or.* 1. 24.

⁶ Cf. *Leg.* 2. 69.

⁷ *Ad Q. Fr.* 3. 5. 1.

⁸ *HSCP* 62 (1957) 8.

⁹ Cf. *N. D.* 1. 61; 2. 2, 168; 3. 5, 6, 94; T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (New York, 1952) vol. 2, p. 96.

¹⁰ Cf. *N. D.* 1. 15, 58.

¹¹ Cf. *Ac.* 2. 5-6, where Cicero makes a special point of defending his practice of introducing men of public eminence in his philosophic dialogues.

¹² Cf. R. E. Jones, "Cicero's Accuracy of Characterization in His Dialogues," *AJP* 60 (1939) 307; M. Ruch, "Vérité historique, véracité de la tradition, vraisemblance de la mise en scène dans les dialogues de Cicéron," *REL* 26 (1948) 61-63.

¹³ Cf. *Ad Att.* 13. 12; 13. 16. 1; 13. 19. 5.

¹⁴ Cf. *Div.* 1. 132; 2. 100.

¹⁵ Cf. *Ad Q. Fr.* 3. 5. 1-2.

¹⁶ Cf. E. A. Robinson, *HSCP* 60 (1951) 301.

¹⁷ *HSCP* 62 (1957) 9-12, 19.

¹⁸ Cf. *N. D.* 2. 73; 3. 18.

¹⁹ *N. D.* 1. 10.

²⁰ *N. D.* 3. 95.

²¹ *HSCP* 62 (1957) 17-18.

²² *Ad Att.* 13. 19. 4.

²³ Cicero was chosen augur in 53 B.C. to fill the vacancy created by the death of Crassus. He also wrote a work entitled *De Auguriis*, perhaps not long after his election to the college. On the political value of divination cf. *Div.* 2. 28, 43, 70, 74, 75; *Leg.* 2. 31-33.

²⁴ Cf. *Div.* 2. 198; *N. D.* 3. 5.

THE FORUM

MARGARET M. FORBES, EDITOR

HUMANISM ON TRIAL

WOLFGANG SCHALL

[The following speech was given at the occasion of a parent-teachers meeting at the Eberhard-Ludwig-Gymnasium at Stuttgart, Germany. Mr. Schall was a Lieutenant-Colonel in the German Army, captured by the Russians, and condemned to hard labor for his refusal to cooperate with them in communist propaganda. He now holds an important position in the European Defense Army. The talk was sent by Hugo Stinnes to Professor Robert Ulich of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, who, together with Dr. Hedwig Schlieffer, prepared the English version. We are indebted to Professor Ulich for the address, excerpts of which appear below.]

During the long years of suffering in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps, many friends of humanistic education have been filled with gratitude for the inspiration they once received. Hence, I believe, they will share my wish to thank the institution from which we received this gift. When each of us embarked in life, those of us who had attended a humanistic Gymnasium soon began to realize the importance of our education, so often disputed and disparaged. However, not before the years of severest suffering did we feel its true spiritual value. I realize the highly individual character of such experience, yet it proved universally true that many of us owed the strength and courage of survival in times of severest hardships to the fount of humanistic values. To speak about it means to do service to a truth that we, as young students, once accepted in good faith but that proved its value under conditions when only few truths could stand the test. *Exitus acta probat.*

After the complete breakdown of all our once cherished hopes and values, desperate and uncertain as to the fate of our homeland, our families, and our friends, enduring unheard hardships in Soviet camps, lacking even vital necessities to keep us alive, few of us could maintain an active spiritual life. . . . Only very few of the ideals that we cherished in normal times persisted when we were facing limitless emptiness. Many were found wanting when fate demanded a screening. And exactly those ethical values

proved most reliable and reassuring, which, in spite of being recognized since time immemorial, were accepted unthinkingly in normal daily life. They were those which, in each individual according to his nature, formed the image of human dignity, of self-respect, and even of hopes beyond this world. No assault from outside could destroy them.

Which were these ethical values? We mean *religio* in the broadest sense, the bond with the Eternal-Divine, reaching beyond this life. . . . We do not intend to belittle the influence of all those who devoutly adhere to the Christian religion. We believe, however, that the bond which firmly ties man to the Divine-Unfathomable came primarily from the classical ideals of humanistic thought. It was neither accidental, nor detrimental to the Christian spirit when centuries ago the European world rediscovered the eternal ideals of humanism and incorporated them into its own culture. By the spirit of Socrates' quest for truth, by awareness of the shallowness and imperfections of the world, by the conviction that life is worth living and that there is a higher harmony, both the devout Christian and the sceptic gained inner force and courage to search on where apparently all was broken down.

In our Russian captivity the ideals and goals of classical humanism of which we had once been told were forced to the ultimate test: the duty to know oneself, to remain calm under difficulty, to live life to the end as honestly as possible, to face death, to pursue our path unmoved even in the valley of the shadow and to strive for spiritual beauty, with serenity and understanding for all that is human. . . .

At first sight it seemed absurd to consider humanism the mainspring of our life in captivity. In truth, our thoughts were not wasted on morbid and negative impressions. Exactly because we were remote from the active and bustling life that went on outside, we could dwell on thoughts of a past of joy and happiness which had been ours. And so deeply were we absorbed in this recall that only then did the true joy and richness of the past become manifest in its absolute greatness. In these years of profound meditation the relativism gave way to an absolute view. It was the *nil humanum a me alienum*, though in grief, in anxiety,

and with little hope of emerging from our valley of shadow.

The valley prepared us to grasp life *entire*, in its total worth, with all its ups-and-downs, its woes and joys. Our longing and hoping for the good and beautiful in life guarded us from becoming victims of scepticism, nihilism, and still more, from the bored matter-of-factness that so frequently follows from material prosperity. The humanist goal of being at peace, moderate and unmoved, and the lesson of accepting fate as it comes, controlled us almost unconsciously.

Once more in history, the re-discovery of humanism becomes the urgent and common task of our age. Despite all differences in personal experience, the basic characteristics of our age are still the same: on the one hand, sensual enjoyment of life, shallow materialism, and a feeling of excessive haste that does not allow time for arriving at true and vital goals; on the other hand, we worry about the preservation of what has been painstakingly built, lest the cherished values of our culture may succumb to apathy and nihilism. In our captivity we could observe the same phenomenon on a small scale. During these years of Soviet imprisonment, we had to master the same historical task: to assert time-honored cultural values against the impact of a world which can offer nothing but a diabolically shrewd system based on lies, cynicism, and hatred, contrived for the exploitation of human weakness.

In all ages humanistic ideas have been the only path to solve the almost insoluble, namely, to lead humanity from suffering, weariness, and folly to clarity, peace of mind, self-control, and inner freedom. For as humanism blended with the spirit of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and Classicism without losing its own character, so it may also give our age new values for generations to come.

Does our age realize how strong our spiritual resources really are? Here lies the main danger. If we consider the whole range of virtues, from the old ideals of chivalry throughout all phases of Western philosophy to the spiritual strength of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, everywhere in our past we can discover man's momentous capacity for rising from material to higher spheres. One glance at the pseudo-philosophy of Bolshevism should impel us to stress this heritage and to prove that in the contest between dignity and servitude the first must gain the victory.

This is the mission of the elite of modern Europe. But school humanism is but a secondary phenomenon—it will be a vain undertaking as long as our adult society cannot free itself from the opinion that the school's chief purpose is to train youth for a profession and earning a living. Rather the school must aim at the development of the entire man and procure an early understanding that there exist more important tasks in life than the attainment of mere professional skill and material success.

This is the call of destiny on man. This insight allowed us to survive captivity physically and spiritually, and it applies to all human struggle, now as much as ever. It has always been our task to prove the worth of life, to pursue truth, beauty, and nobility, and if life offered us abundance, to enjoy it consciously, but with the restraint that pays the ephemeral no more attention than it deserves, and forbids sorrow, misfortune, and hardship to triumph over the everlasting.

Not the school, but life alone can teach us all this. The school which, for some reason or another, calls humanism a useful, profitable, or practical precept for the struggle of material survival has not yet reaped its entire harvest. At most it is only instrumental in implanting it by strengthening the power of the mind, forming political judgment through the teaching of history, and by handing down ancient cultural values.

The supreme gift that God has given man, or the secret of the true Eros is expressed in Goethe's "Wenn ihr's nicht fühlt, ihr werdet's nie erjagen." Hence the most important work to be done with young persons is to prepare them to open their souls to this feeling when the right moment comes. How otherwise could man be guided through a world of fanaticism and narrow-mindedness on the one side, and apathetic materialism on the other? Only the feeling of love can create the understanding for all things truly human, reverence for the dignity and the life of our fellowmen, and tolerance, probably the greatest of man's virtues.

I do not know what greater gratitude could be expressed to a school than through the confession that it planted in us the seed of feelings and ideas which grew in strength and meaning, the more our life was threatened by the demons of bitterness, of senselessness and despair.

OPERATION INFORMATION

[The following letter shows the growing activities stemming from the Joint Com-

mittee of American Classical Organizations, in particular from its Committee A on Procurement and Preparation of Teachers. A selection of the material sent with the letter is added.)

Dear Fellow Latinists:

In continuing the publicity campaign begun last year under the label OPERATION INFORMATION, we are following up this year with Packet No. 2. This includes a report on projects undertaken in Ohio, Indiana, Maryland, and Minnesota similar to the saturation job undertaken in New Jersey earlier. Other states have made inquiries, are beginning investigations, and give promise of joining the group of actively engaged states. Our goal is to have each state initiate some kind of self-evaluation and improvement plan whereby the teachers themselves know the situation in their state and are able to interpret it for the layman, not to mention advancing the cause of Latin through increased publicity. Among the materials, you will note how Indiana has used the statement of the APA on the status of Latin in the U.S. and compared it with the status of Latin in Indiana in spelling out this information to certain important pressure groups within the state. A sample of the letters sent by Indiana classical organizations shows the study and continuing attention of the group to the problem. This is a fine model. The Ohio Classical Conference appointed a Publicity Chairman and voted \$100 to be used within the state for publicity. College professors in Minnesota and Maryland started one-man campaigns to arrive at information via questionnaires—useful in analyzing and solving problems at the state and local levels. These are included to provide other examples and to encourage you to join the ranks of investigators, fact finders, and publicity peddlers. At your executive meetings or annual meeting, won't you appoint a committee to work on a project designed to benefit Latin in your state in some way? Please report to me your plan; it is the sharing of our work that gives us strength and vision to do more.

The reprints of the articles about the Joint Committee, and this particular committee, are included so that you may know something of the long-range program that is underway on a national scale and how important it is to have state organizations participating. The materials included relative to Latin III-IV and offerings by correspondence, represent some of the work being developed by members of the various

sub-committees of this Committee on the Procurement and Preparation of Teachers. I hope it is material you can use in the campaign for increased enrollment in Latin III-IV in your state.

The pamphlet "The Study of Latin" is descriptive of a sequence offered in two outstanding independent schools and serves as a medium for explaining a curriculum to patrons and as a suggestion to other Latin colleagues.

The letter from a representative of the Classical Association of New England is the type of thing a regional organization can do, as well as a state group.

I hope this packet proves valuable to you, serves as a guide, and that next year some project undertaken in your state will be among those reviewed and suggested as a good example. . . .

CAROLYN BOCK

*N. J. State Teachers College,
Montclair, N. J.*

* * *

Statements on the shortage of Latin teachers are currently documented:

OHIO

"Fifteen per cent of the schools now offering Latin report an immediate need for more teachers in this subject, and before 1962 at least 25 per cent of Ohio's Latin teachers will need replacements. Our colleges receive ten times as many requests for Latin teachers as they are able to fill! Most of the high schools reporting—219 out of 345—have at least one student interested in becoming a teacher of Latin, and in an even larger number (284) there is an "unused" teacher qualified in Latin. Of the high schools which do not now offer Latin, 50 per cent attributed their situation to an inability to find a qualified Latin teacher."

INDIANA

"Approximately 20,000 boys and girls study Latin each year in the public schools. (Currently 400,000 youths in the U.S. study Latin each year.) Less than 300 continue with the third and fourth years of Latin, the usual source of Latin teachers. . . . These vocation possibilities for prospective teachers of Latin are further indicated by the following data:

"In Indiana 445 schools offer Latin.

"Last year 421 requests were received by Indiana colleges and universities to supply Latin teachers. Of these requests, 202 were unduplicated.

"In 1956 there were only seven graduates

from Indiana colleges who were licensed to teach Latin.

"The school population is increasing, and with it comes an increasing enrollment in Latin classes.

"Will you publicize among your members and other students the vocational opportunities of continuing the study of Latin and preparing to teach Latin in Indiana schools?"

MARYLAND

"There is a definite increase of interest in Latin. . . . Forty-six schools reported an increase during the last three years, and 37 no increase. Comments indicated that the inability to obtain adequately prepared teachers prevented the development of additional offerings in Latin.

"There is need for more students to prepare for teaching Latin. The present number in both secondary school and in college, is inadequate to meet the apparent need. Forty-nine teachers are reported as needed in the next five years.

"There is a need for some type of refresher course or other preparation for teachers once qualified for Latin but who have not been teaching it in recent years. There is a similar need for active teachers who wish to increase their effectiveness as Latin teachers."

WISCONSIN

A letter sent by The Committee on Trends in Latin in Wisconsin (Latin Section, Wisconsin Education Association) to PTA members, graphically describes the local situation:

"Has your teenager considered teaching as a career? In view of the growing shortage of teachers in America, did you know that the demand for Latin teachers is greater than the demand in any other field? The following statistics point out the acute shortage in our high schools.

"University of Wisconsin: 102 calls last year, 2 available. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee: 75 calls made in last two years, 8 available. University of Marquette: 84 calls in the last three years, 11 available.

"It has been stated in the conclusions of a study made in Wisconsin last year by the American Philological Association that the chief reason for this disparity is that the majority of students who take Latin in high school terminate their study at the end of two years. When they enter college, they are afraid to enter Latin because of the gap of a year or more. Introducing third- and fourth-year Latin in schools where it does not exist, and increasing enrollment in those

schools where it is taught at the present time would be a big step forward in recruiting teachers for this field.

"We hope that among your sons and daughters will be found the nucleus of those who will teach Latin to the ever increasing number of students enrolling in this course in our high schools."

FROM THE HIGH SCHOOLS

Latinus Rumor is the name of the newspaper composed and edited by the Latin students of Hazel Farmer of Webster Groves, Missouri. The October issue began its thirty-first year of continuous publication, which surely must set a record for longevity of a high-school paper. During the years in which we have seen *Rumor*, we have observed its consistently high calibre, and the balance maintained between information and entertainment. The cartoons and art work appearing in every issue attest the versatility of Miss Farmer's students, and the standard of excellence which is evident throughout.

* * *

A timely student editorial from *Aquila* (published by the Junior Classical League chapter in Cheyenne [Wyoming] Senior High School) indicates the values our students consider important in Latin:

"SPUTNIK is the latest word. On October 5, 1957, a new note drowned the blare of the juke box and brought the American teenager up to date. Heard round the world, the ominous measure of the Russian satellite is number one on the international power parade. Briefly, and temporarily, "we're shook." Young Americans must find a better word.

"Meanwhile, back at the samovar, a new group of young soviets is signing up for an educational program with special emphasis on difficult subjects. Turn, then, *amici mei*, to that Latin. Sharpen your minds to learn that word we must find!"

* * *

Classroom suggestion from the New Jersey Bulletin, for Derivative Study:

"A NEW WORD A DAY WILL KEEP IGNORANCE AWAY. Students bring in Latin-derived words met in their other classes, reading, or listening, and place word, and story of its derivation and meaning on the Bulletin Board."

FRESHMAN SCHOLARSHIPS: HARVARD

Dr. George Kennedy sends the following information of interest to high-school teachers

and their students:

"Information on the very large number of scholarships open to incoming students at Harvard and Radcliffe can best be obtained by writing directly to the directors of admission of the colleges in Cambridge. There are, however, two scholarships of special classical interest:

"The *George Emerson Lowell Prize Scholarships*, awarded annually on the basis of a written examination in Greek and Latin or in Latin alone, given at the candidates' schools in April. The stipend varies from one hundred dollars upwards. Candidates ordinarily have studied Latin through Virgil, or Greek and Latin through Homer and Virgil. Additional information, applications, and registration blanks are to be obtained from the Committee on Scholarships and Financial Aids, 20 University Hall, Harvard College, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

"The *James Adams Woolson Prize Scholarship* is similarly awarded by Radcliffe College on the basis of the same examination in Greek and Latin, or in Latin alone. The stipend varies from two hundred dollars upwards. Information is to be obtained from the Director of Admissions, Radcliffe College, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts."

LATIN-WEEK PRIZES

DONNIS MARTIN

Chairman, Latin Week Committee

For the third year the Latin Week Committee of CAMWS has offered a prize in each state for the best report on a Latin Week

celebration. The prize this year was: *The Book of the Ancient Romans* by Dorothy Mills. The state chairmen of Latin Week judged the reports and made the awards.

The following schools and teachers were awarded prizes for their Latin Week celebrations: Mrs. Olivia Fines, Tuscaloosa High School, Tuscaloosa, Ala.; Mrs. Ruth Bond, Vidalia High School, Vidalia, Ga.; Mrs. Bess C. Hussey, Alexis High School, Alexis, Ill.; Miss Mabel Hodson, New Castle High School, New Castle, Ind.; Miss Florence Gates, Robinson Intermediate School, Wichita, Kans.; Mrs. James B. Wimpy, Glasgow High School, Glasgow, Ky.; Sister Leon Marie, St. Agnes High School, St. Paul, Minn.; Sister Patrick Joseph, Incarnate Word Academy, St. Louis, Mo.; Miss Harriett Wiggins, Lee Edwards High School, Ashville, N. C.; Mrs. E. E. Person, Gallatin High School, Gallatin, Tenn.; and Mrs. Katherine Miler, Mullens High School, Mullens, West Va.

State Chairmen of Latin Week who awarded prizes: Prof. H. R. Butts, Birmingham-Southern College, Birmingham, Ala.; Miss Mary Fletcher, Bass High School, Atlanta, Ga.; Miss Susan Greer, Streator, Ill.; Miss Gertrude Johnson, Logansport, Ind.; Miss Alice Ham, Hutchinson, Kans.; Miss Elizabeth Smith, Frankfort, Ky.; Miss Irene Walker, Hibbing, Minn.; Miss Jessie Helen Branam, Trenton, Mo.; Dr. Charles Henderson, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.; Prof. O. C. Perry, George Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville, Tenn.; and Miss Lucy Whitsel, Marshall College, Huntington, West Va.

The Fifty-Fourth Annual Meeting

Classical Association of the Middle West and South

The University of Texas, Austin

April 10-12, 1958

Ovid as *Praeceptor Amoris*

ROBERT M. DURLING

THE FIGURE OF THE author which appears in a literary work is distinct from the author himself. It is a self-dramatization of some kind, and as such represents at least a selection and intensification of his traits, if not some kind of distortion. Not only the particular characteristics chosen for representation, but also the role this *persona* (as I shall refer to the self-portrait as distinct from the author) plays in the work are to a greater or lesser extent conventional; they conform to general types established by either literary or psychological convention or both. The new insistence upon the personal, subjective—even unique—quality of the *persona*'s experience which we find in Propertius' elegies, and which seems to have been the chief quality distinguishing them from older forms of erotic elegiac poetry, does not prevent the role of lover in which the *persona* is cast from depending heavily on the traditional psychology of love as developed in comedy and elsewhere.¹

Naturally enough, in most instances the *persona* is meant to be accepted by the reader as identical with the poet. The more elaborate the poet's art, of course, the less likely the reader is to fall an unreflecting victim to the illusion, since much of the pleasure may depend upon the reader's awareness of the skill or tact with which the self-portrait is presented. Such an awareness, however, is likely to be an afterthought or a markedly subordinated perception.

Sometimes, however, the *persona* is presented in such a way as to em-

phasize the distinction between poet and mask. In those cases, the awareness that the poet is manipulating the *persona* considerably intensifies the feeling that he is manipulating the work as a whole. One of the most remarkable examples of that posture of superiority to the material is found in the *Amores*, *Ars Amatoria*, and *Remedia Amoris* of Ovid. While it had been the intent of earlier elegists to achieve an effect of sincerity,² Ovid deliberately plays with the conventions in such a way as to emphasize the pretence involved in his assumption of the various roles. Book 1 of the *Amores*, for instance, opens with an elaborate prologue in which the poet first decides that he will write love poetry rather than epic (1. 1); second, formally submits to the power of Cupid (1. 2); third—and only third—mentions meeting the girl (1. 3).³ This elaborate and deliberately artificial opening, with all of its explicit discussion of the distinctions between the genres, is in marked contrast to the opening of Propertius' first book:

Cynthia prima suis miserum me cepit
ocellis
Contactum nullis ante cupidinibus.

The *Amores*, however, are not our chief concern. The literary game which they embody, witty as it is, becomes tiresome. It was in the *Ars Amatoria* and the *Remedia Amoris* that Ovid's peculiar technical gifts found the material most suited to them.

The originality of the *Ars Amatoria* is generally said to be the casting of

erotic instruction in the form of the didactic poem.⁴ As has long been recognized, the particular precepts Ovid offers are largely derived both from other elegists and from the whole tradition of erotic literature.⁵ A. L. Wheeler pointed out some time ago that even the role of *praeceptor amoris* is assumed by both Propertius and Tibullus,⁶ and introduced his discussion by saying:

The role of *praeceptor amoris* is seen in its fullest development in Ovid's *Ars amatoria*. But the *Ars amatoria*, like so much else in the work of that facile poet, was only the expansion and development to more definite form of an element already present in Roman elegy.⁷

As Professor Wheeler pointed out in his conclusion, however, the "profession of experience" of the *praeceptor* "connects the eroto-didactic element with the personal, rendering it part and parcel of the subjective-erotic note, which is the chief characteristic of Roman elegy."⁸ Indeed, the instruction Propertius and Tibullus give is motivated by the supposed intensity of their personal experience, and thus there is a fundamentally serious note in their assumptions of the role. Ovid's presentation of the role, however, is profoundly different from that of his predecessors because it is primarily facetious, and it is here, it seems to me, that his greatest originality lies.

As was suggested above, much of the amusement of the poem derives from its parody of the serious didactic poem.⁹ The irony of the parody is intensified by the fact that the traditionally ungovernable passion¹⁰ which the *magister* claims to have reduced to system is no longer the very serious matter involving the entire existence, the status in society, and the very sanity of the poet which it is in Propertius and Tibullus, but the sophisticated pursuit of pleasure—as Emile Ripert aptly put it, "l'art d'aimer sans amour."¹¹ Hence there is an element of parody of the earlier elegy, since it is part of the game for the fashionable rake as Ovid

envisages him to ape the truly passion-stricken lover. (May this be the real reason why Ovid killed Roman elegy, that after him the conventions could not be used without the taint of pretence?) The heroic and mythological comparisons, which are usually serious in Propertius, and which, because of the intensity of emotion he conveys, are not felt to be out of keeping with his subject, become in the *Ars* and *Remedie* a principal source of humor precisely because the discrepancy is so great and is given such emphasis.

The vehicle of all this irony and parody is the *persona*. Let us examine a few passages.

Siquis in hoc artem populo non novit
amandi,

Hoc legat et lecto carmine doctus amet!
Arte citae veloce rates remoque moventur,
Arte leves currus: arte regendus Amor.
Curribus Automedon lentisque erat aptus
habenis,

Tiphys in Haemonia puppe magister erat:
Me Venus artificem tenero praecepit Amori;
Tiphys et Automedon dear Amoris ego.

(*Ars* 1. 1-8)¹²

The very first lines of the poem begin a complex play of irony. The subject of the poem is slyly announced in the first line as something most people probably know about already, while Ovid is quite aware of and takes care to signalize again and again the novelty of his poem. The second line suggests that all one needs to do in order to become a learned and up-to-date lover is to read through the poem once—*lecto carmine*. After drawing the parallel between the arts of sailing and chariot-driving and this new art of love, the *persona* makes an elaborate boast. He says that Venus herself has appointed him tutor to Cupid, and that he will be known as the Automedon and Tiphys of love. We know, of course, that he is speaking figuratively: he does not mean that he has actually tutored the god, nor that he has mastered his own passions, but that he has been clever enough to systematize an approach. But we know at once that it cannot be the insane *furor* of true love which is

so governable, and that method is applicable only to a situation in which the passions are but shallowly stirred. This is the first appearance of the pretence that the pursuit of pleasure is violent, involved passion. Indeed, the boast of controlling Cupid is, in its ironic exaggeration, a way of suggesting the poet's technical control of the poem, since it focuses our attention on the verbal wit.

This last point becomes even clearer in the next few lines:

Phillyrides puerum cithara perfectit
Achillem
Atque animos placida contudit arte
feros:
Qui totiens socios, totiens exterruit
hostes,
Creditur annosum pertimuisse senem;
Quas Hector sensurus erat, poscente magistro
Verberibus iussas praebuilt ille manus.
Aeacidae Chiron, ego sum praeceptor Amoris:
Saevus uterque puer, natus uterque dea.
(Ars 1. 11-18)

Here the discrepancy between the witty amorous *persona* and the heroic centaur Chiron is given such emphasis, and is so comic, that the serious idea of the rational control of passion—if it was ever present—evaporates (and the parallel itself suggests the taming of love will be as impermanent as was Chiron's of Achilles), and we laughingly submit to the outrageous impudence. What these lines prepare us for is a brilliant and impudent display of virtuosity, and we might note at this point that the metaphors of sailing and chariot-driving, used in this introduction to illustrate the idea of the art of love, are the regular *tópoi* in terms of which the progress of the poem is referred to. Another fundamental metaphor identifies the course of the poem with that of a love affair—the reader's.¹³ This raises a point of fundamental importance. The art of love is applicable only in an imaginary world, a world in which human beings have no profound needs or passions; as soon as the possibility of genuine passion

arises, the problem of responsibility presents itself, and the cynical manipulation of others can no longer be treated lightly. This is a world of "as if," and the identification of the course of the poem with the reader's love affair calls our attention to that fact. In effect, it shifts the problem of the application of the art from the practical sphere to the poetic, where we admire the technical brilliance of the poet.

The *praeceptor* claims that his instruction has the firm basis of actual experience. The claim is made, however, in such a mock-serious tone that we are immediately alert for the technique. In lines 22-30 the *persona*'s personal experience is impudently made to seem a far better guide than anything Hesiod learned from birds or Muses:

Non ego, Phoebe, datas a te mihi mentiar
artes,
Nec nos aerae voce monemur avis,
Nec mihi sunt visae Clio Cliusque sorores
Servanti pecudes vallibus, Ascra, tuis;
Usus opus movet hoc: vati parete perito!
Vera canam: coeptis, mater Amoris, ades!
(Ars 1. 25-30)

The *praeceptor* has not been staying in an isolated valley tending sheep! The claim of personal experience is thus an integral part of the elaborate bravura of this pose. I shall assume that the "personal experiences" the *praeceptor* mentions to support his instructions are fictitious, for which we have Ovid's own word (*Tristia* 2), but the *praeceptor* himself is a fictitious *persona*.

In Book 2 the same vaunts of authority—and of success in teaching the techniques—are made, and the boasts become even more exaggerated. Here again we find the identification of the poem (instructions) with the successful application of the technique:

Arte mea captast, arte tenenda maest.
(2. 12)

The *praeceptor*'s success is so great that the lover will bestow on him the

palm taken away from Homer and Hesiod:

Dicite 'io Paean!' et 'io' bis dicite
 'Paean!'
 Decidit in casses praeda petita meos;
 Laetus amans donat viridi mea carmina
 palma
 Praelata Asraeo Maenioque seni.
 (2. 1-4)

The second book will be concerned with an even harder task:

Magna paro, quas possit Amor remanere per
 artes,
 Dicere, tam vasto pervagus orbe puer.
 Et levis est et habet geminas, quibus
 avolet alas:
 Difficilest illis inposuisse modum.
 (2. 17-20)

The difficulty of holding Cupid back leads into one of the frequent decorative tales, that of Daedalus and Icarus, whose application, typical in its wit of the virtuosity with which Ovid connects his digressions with the main movement of the poem, demonstrates again the verbal resolution of the control of love:

Non potuit Minos hominis conpescere
 pinnae:
 Ipse deum voluerem detinuisse paro!
 (2. 97-98)

At the end of Book 2, Ovid returns to the language of the vaunts of the opening of Book 1. The *persona* claims to have fulfilled the promises made there, and extends even further the humorous amplification in literal statement of what began as metaphor:

Quantus apud Danaos Podalirius arte mendendi,
 Aeacides dextra, pectore Nestor erat,
 Quantus erat Calchas extis, Telamonius armis,
 Automedon curru, tantus amator ego.
 Me vatem celebrate, viri, mihi dicite laudes,
 Cantetur toto nomen in orbe meum!
 (2. 735-40)

Here the successful teaching of the art (actually, the completion of a unit of the poem) is identified with successful

application of it; previously the steps in the instruction were metaphorically seen as the steps in the pupil's love affair, but now the (metaphorical) success of the pupil is seen as the *praeceptor's* own amatory prowess. The placing of the successful lover (*praeceptor*) among the heroes (an exaggeration of the wit of the *militia amoris*—*Militat omnis amans, et habet sua castra cupido*—*Amores* 1. 9. 1) is a further inflation of the initial idea that the *magister amoris* is the rival of the great heroic *magistri* such as Chiron. In finally demanding recognition as *poet*, Ovid explicitly identifies his "amatory prowess" as his poetic virtuosity.

The comic juxtaposition which we find in these vaunts of the *praeceptor* is one of the basic comic devices of the poem. The citation of heroic and mythological precedents for each of the precepts is a delightful parody of pedantry, and involves reducing the heroes and gods to the level of the Roman demi-monde (just as the vaunts of the *praeceptor* place him among the heroes). Most frequent and most important are the ironic references to the Homeric stories. For example, Menelaus is to blame for his own troubles; an expert cannot blame Helen, she simply could not bear to sleep alone, and Paris—like a true gentleman—merely helped her out (2. 359 ff.). The lover is urged to learn from Agamemnon the advisability of hiding his infidelities from his mistress, since it was Agamemnon's unfaithfulness which caused Clytemnestra to take a lover—and we all know how that ended (2. 399 ff.).

The legends of Rome's noble past do not escape unscathed. In a parody of the aetiological poem the *praeceptor* explains that the theater is a good hunting ground for the young rake because it was at a theatrical festival that the Romans carried off the Sabine women (1. 101-34). The cleverness and impudence are delightful here; the decorative tale is told with great skill,

and the application is brilliantly sardonic:

Romule, militibus scisti dare commoda
solus!

Haec mihi si dederis commoda, miles
ero!

(1. 131-32)

How surly old Romulus would have been appalled!¹⁴

Many brilliant passages depend upon this kind of impudent manipulation and juxtaposition. In Book 1, for example, Ovid presents a long digression on the prospective victories of Gaius Caesar over the Parthians (1. 177-228). The praises of Gaius are sung with ostensible patriotic fervor, in all the pomp of heroic diction, invocation of the gods, and righteous indignation. The victorious battle is imagined, and the whole ends with Gaius' triumph:¹⁵

Ergo erit illa dies, qua tu, pulcherrime
rerum,

Quattuor in niveis aureis ibis equis.

(1. 213-14)

Then the triumph is shown to be an occasion for seduction! Not only that, the young stay-at-home rake is urged to lie about the triumph in order to seem well informed:

Omnia responde: nec tantum siqua rogabit;

Et quae nescieris, ut bene nota refer!

Hic est Euphrates, praecinctus harundine
frontem;

Cui coma dependet caerula, Tigris erit.

Hos facito Armenios, haec est Danaeia
Persis;

Urbs in Achaemeniis vallibus ista fuit;

Ille vel ille duces; et erunt quae nomina
dicas

Si poteris, vere, si minus, apta tamen.

(1. 221-28)

The reader expects this to be a conventional complimentary digression until he comes to the end of it. Until then the interest lies principally in the vivacity with which Ovid is able to inform the convention. When we come to the application, however, the tables are brilliantly turned, and Gaius is shown to exist for the commodity of the fashionable rakes of Rome.

In much the same way philosophy and cosmology are wrenched to the purposes of the *magister amoris*. The witty sensualist reminds his pupils that beauty is fleeting, and urges them to cultivate the things of the spirit—in order to continue to attract lights o' love to the end (2. 113-22). And just as concord succeeded chaos in the formation of the world, so you should silence the reproaches of your furiously (and justifiably) jealous mistress by administering the strong medicine of love (2. 467-92).

Just after this last passage, Apollo appears to the *praeceptor* and offers additional advice to the ambitious in love. The effect here is complex. We admire the cleverness with which the usual method of direct preception is varied by the pretence of divine help. More important, the advice Apollo gives is highly comic—the manipulator makes him show how the Delphic oracle's most famous words—*nosce teipsum*—are applicable to philanderings: know your strong points and how to capitalize on them (2. 494-510)! Our awareness of the manipulating hand is intensified by the *persona's* appeal to the authority of the god:

Sic monuit Phoebus: Phoebo parete monenti!

Certa dei sacrost huius in ore fides.

(2. 509-10)

The structure of the four books of the *Ars* and *Remedia* depends as much on the increasing complexity of this ironic manipulation as it does upon an ordering of the subject matter. In the third book, the *praeceptor* displays his virtuosity by arming the other side in the war between the sexes. He has plenty of weapons left over, and Venus has in fact ordered him to arm the women, because he has given the men an unfair advantage! That the girls need help is clear. The most famous heroines were unhappy in love and the whole list of them (Medea, Ariadne, Dido, etc., etc.) lost their lovers simply because they were ignorant of the *ars*. The girls are still ignorant, but

Ovid will have pity on them (3. 33-44). The effect of the third book thus depends to a large extent upon the cleverness with which parallels between it and the preceding books are exploited. Similar advice is given about dress (1. 505; 3. 129), cleanliness (1. 513; 3. 193), the habitat of the prey (1. 67; 3. 387), the relative virtues of youth and maturity (2. 665; 3. 555), the use of letters (1. 437, 2. 350; 3. 469), and so forth. More important, the girls are given weapons to counteract those given to the men. Thus in Book 1 the *praeceptor* urges the men not to worry about perjuring themselves when making promises:

Nec timide promitte: trahunt promissa
puellas;
Pollicito testes quoslibet adde deos!
Iuppiter ex alto periuria ridet amantum.
(1. 631-33)

And in Book 3 he warns the girls against believing men when they swear, and advises them to play the same game:

Parcite, Cecropides, iuranti credere
Theseo:
Quos faciet testis, fecit et ante,
deos. . . .
Si bene promittent, totidem promittite
verbis,
Si dederint, et vos gaudia pacta date.
(3. 457-62)

And both sides of the war are instructed in the essential techniques of arousing and allaying jealousy as need arises (2. 425; 3. 555).

The *Remedia Amoris* carries these methods yet a step further: not only can Ovid arm both sides of the struggle, but he can arm one who wants to get out of it. The figure of the *praeceptor* is presented with many of the same methods as in the other books, but the comedy is pushed a step further. In Book 3 he claims the heroines could have kept their lovers if only they had had his treatise. Here he says that his book would have saved the lives of Phyllis and Dido; it would have pre-

vented the crimes of Tereus, Pasiphae, Medea, Phaedra, Paris, Scylla (*Rem.* 55-68), and Aegisthus (*Rem.* 161-68), since all these suicides and criminals only needed the benefit of his expert advice in order to overcome their unfortunate passions. As usual, the fun depends on our keeping clearly in mind the distinction between genuine human passion and its metamorphosis, in the impudent hands of the *persona*, into shallow pleasure-seeking. If we mistake the *persona*'s Phaedra for a real Phaedra, or this pretended world for the real world, we lose the effect of the wit, which again has the effect of drawing our attention to the poet's technical control of the entire fabric.

The *Remedia* opens with the poet's seeking—and receiving—Cupid's approval of his writing for the cure of love on the ground that in preventing suicides and crimes for love it will keep Cupid from getting a bad name (1-40). Not only that, but Cupid himself is to be laid under contribution for effective ways of overcoming love (555 ff.). The whole point of the *Remedia*, indeed, is announced in the lines presenting the ultimate boasts of the *persona*:

Discite sanari per quem didicistis amare:
Una manus vobis vulnus opemque feret.
(43-44)
Naso legendus erat tum cum didicistis
amare:
Idem nunc vobis Naso legendus erit.
(73-74)

This completion of the brilliant exposé of the poet's command of his medium naturally includes the most impudent of Ovid's many references to his own works. Just as in Book 3 he referred the girls to his treatise on make-up, so in this book on the cure of love he works in a footnote to the Art of Love: follow the example of Agamemnon, he says, who rid himself of his passion for Chryseis by taking on Briseis:

Ergo adsume novas auctore Agamemnone
flammas,
Ut tuus in bivio distineatur amor!
Quaeris, ubi invenies: artes, i, perlege
nostras:

Plena puellarum iam tibi navis erit.
(485-88)

The defense of his poems against detractors, which forms one of the lengthier digressions of the *Remedia*, is just as outrageous. It begins with the proclamation that he does not care what his critics say in the first place—why should he? Everyone is reading his poems (363-64). The complaint he sets out to dispose of is that his Muse (i.e., his style) is *proterva*—shameless—as if, indeed, that were a fault! He naturally does not deny the charge, but claims rather that he is not to be blamed, since the decorum of elegy requires such a manner. Surely he is not to write like an epic poet! This is of course the most impudent and transparent begging of the question: as Zoilus might well point out, why choose a *materia proterva*? It conveys a further suggestion, moreover: that the poet is just as capable of epic or tragedy as he is of elegy—his *protervitas* is simply a manner adopted for the moment because of literary considerations. The whole then ends with a triumphant taunt, in which Ovid says he has just begun to write: his detractors have begun too soon, since they will be even more shocked by his next poems:

Sed nimum properas: vivam modo, plura
dolebis;
Et capiant animi carmina plura mei.
(391-92)

Indeed, he will not stop until he knows writers of elegy will confess they owe as much to him as the epic does to Virgil (393-94; cf. *Ars* 2. 3-4)!

So far we have been examining passages in which the *persona* explicitly proclaims his mastery both of the subject matter and the literary medium, and in which his virtuosity is displayed by ironic manipulation and juxtaposition. There are some interesting passages, both in the *Ars* and in the *Remedia*, in which he suggests some kind of lack of control, and which deserve attention. The passage in the *Remedia* in which Cupid appears to

the *praeceptor* is a good example (549-78). Like the appearance of Apollo in Book 2 of the *Ars*, it serves several purposes: variation, elaboration of the *persona*, fun at the expense of Cupid. Its effect depends on our awareness of the artificiality, the pretence, of it. Hence Ovid calls our attention to the pretence by being "in doubt" as to whether it really was Cupid or a dream which appeared to him. Then he goes on and decides that it was not the real Cupid (555-56, 576). After relating the advice Apollo gave in *Ars* 2, we remember, the *persona* made an appeal to the authority of the god. Here the equally facetious decision that it was only a dream diminishes the divine authority of the advice—it is a kind of bravura of control. Such also is the note on which the passage ends—he pretends to be at a loss as to how to go on, since Cupid, his *Palinurus*, has deserted him in unknown waters (577-78).

The effect of such pretences of doubt and lack of control is obviously a function of the general pose of absolute control (and of our feeling of manipulation in the specific instance). If he here pretends to be in doubt or to be ignorant of the material (*ignotas cogor inire vias*), elsewhere he pretends to be forgetful:

Quam paene admonui, ne trux caper iret in
alas!

(*Ars* 3. 193)

or unwilling:

Eloquar invitus: teneros ne tange poetas,

and then immediately reminds us of the virtuosity with which he has put himself in such a position:

Summoveo dotes ipsius ipse meas.
(*Rem.* 757-58)

Sometimes he pretends to be ashamed—*Et pudet et dicam* (*Rem.* 407), which is merely a signal that something surpassingly impudent is to follow.

One of the most amusing examples

of this pretence of lack of control occurs in *Ars* 3. 663-72. Here Ovid warns the women to beware of good-looking friends and servants; he pretends to be so carried away by the pedagogic instinct that he gives himself away:

Haec quoque, quae praebet lectum studiosa locumque,

Crede mihi, mecum non semel illa fuit.
Nec nimium vobis formosa ancilla minis-
tret:

Saepe vicem dominae praebuit illa mihi.
Quo feror insanus? quid aperto pectore in
hostem

Mittor et indicio prodor ab ipse meo?
Non avis aucupibus monstrat, qua parte
petatur;

Non docet infestos currere cerva canes.
Viderit utilitas! ego coepta fideliter edam
Lemnias et gladios in mea fata dabo.¹⁶

This supposedly autobiographical reference in fact appears in the poem for the sake of demonstrating the poet's control. No one is fooled, and of course no one is expected to be. The pretence of unwitting self-betrayal is a further emphasis on the absolute artistic will, just as the claim that *usus opus movet hoc* of Book 1 is a function of the parody of the serious didactic poem. Most of the little incidents Ovid presents as taken from his own experience in fact involve some kind of mistake, gaucherie, or lack of control:

Me memini iratum dominae turbasse capil-
los:

Haec mihi quam multos abstulit ira dies!
Nec puto nec sensi tunicam laniasse, sed
ipsa

Dixerat: et pretiosam illam redempta meo;
At vos, si sapitis, vestri peccata magistri
Effugite et culpa damna timeate meae!
(*Ars* 2. 169-74)

Haeserat in quadam nuper mea cura puella:
Conveniensi animo non erat illa meo;
Curabar propriis aeger Podalirius herbis,
Et, fateor, medicus turpiter aeger eram.
(*Rem.* 311-14)¹⁷

The mistakes of the *persona qua* lover, of course, simply make it possible for him to be all the more effective as *magister*—and all the more amusing. This opposite posture of lack of control—whether over the process of writ-

ing or over the course of a love affair—is thus one of the important subsidiary devices by which the absolute technical control of the poem is suggested.

The advice Cupid gives when he appears to the *praeceptor* in the *Remedia* is typical of all the advice in these poems in that it envisages the means of dealing with a set of categories of personal experiences. We should note the ways in which ends and means are related:

Filius hunc miles, te filia nubilis angat!
Et quis non causas mille doloris habet?
Ut possis odisse tuam, Pari, funera fratrum
Debueras oculis substituisse tuis.

(571-74)

The purpose of the imagined pupil is that of ridding himself of an attachment which for some reason has become irksome. To remind oneself of one's duties is a means toward this other end. As if sons who are soldiers, marriageable daughters, or dying brothers exist simply as distractions for the man who wants to get over a love affair, and have no claim upon him in themselves. This is the same kind of irony which introduced Gaius' victories into the poem only to point out how they could serve the purposes of the seducer. It is no accident, therefore, that Gaius and the claims of patriotism reappear in the *Remedia*, now serving the purposes of the renouncer of love (149-58).

This marshalling of *loci communes* in the *Remedia* raises the question of the relation of the *Artes* to rhetoric. Ovid's poetry, as has often been pointed out, bears an especially deep imprint of the rhetoric of his day.¹⁸ There is no need to describe his mastery and highly self-conscious use of the *schemata*, on which most attention has been focused. There is, of course, parody of the *controversia* in his arguing of the case of Menelaus vs. Helen in 2. 359 ff., and of the *suasoria* in the passage urging the women to take lovers (3. 57-98).¹⁹ What I wish to emphasize is something more fundamental, some-

thing in Ovid akin to what Socrates attacked in Gorgias.

The attitude of absolute control of the subject matter and of the audience which we have been examining in Ovid's *persona* is precisely the attitude of the sophist, *mutatis mutandis*. The ability to arm both sides in a struggle—or to do away with the struggle itself—all with equal effectiveness (*modo das, modo demis*) is the ability which the sophist chiefly claimed and which the central tradition of ancient rhetoric chiefly sought to develop in the student. Since rhetoric and sophistic in themselves afford no critique of ends, they lead ultimately to the glorification of the orator as superior to all possible subjects of discourse. In Ovid's *Artes* we have a display of pure technique which as such is disinterested, in the sense that it remains superior to and uncommitted to any of the possible subjects or moral positions it is possible to take toward them. What Ovid is doing, perhaps unconsciously, by applying the techniques of rhetoric to an unconventional problem, the didactics of love, is unveiling the fundamental impudence of sophistic rhetoric itself. Such an unveiling can in fact be most effectively achieved by showing how the categories and topics and *loci communes* are applicable to the obviously outrageous and immoral.

The unveiling of rhetorical technique can perhaps best be illustrated by those passages in the *Artes* where Ovid deliberately contradicts himself. The principal instances of this kind of bravura are the passages in which he first inducts and then defends the morals of the female sex. They should be quoted *in extenso*:²⁰

Prima tuae menti veniat fiducia, cunctas
Posse capi: capies, tu modo tende plagas.
Vere prius volucres taceant, aestate cicadae,
Maenalius lepori det sua terga canis,
Femina quam iuveni blande temptata repugnet:
Haec quoque, quam poteris credere nolle, volet.

Utque viro furtiva Venus, sic grata puellae:

Vir male dissimulat, tectius illa cupit;
Conveniat maribus, ne quam nos ante rogemus,

Femina iam partes victa rogantis agat!
Mollibus in pratis admugit femina tauro,
Femina cornipedi semper adhinnit equo;
Parciore in nobis nec tam furiosa libido:
Legitimum finem flamma virilis habet.
Byblida quid referam, vetito quae fratris amore

Arsit et est laqueo fortiter ulta nefas?
Myrrha patrem, sed non qua filia debet, amavit:

Et nunc obducto cortice pressa latet.
(1. 269-86)

I omit the long tale of Pasiphae which follows here, as well as the other examples of female lust (Aerope, Scylla, Clytemnestra, Medea, Clytia, Phaedra), and skip to the application:

Omnia feminea sunt ista libidine mota:
Acrior est nostra plusque furoris habet.
Ergo age, ne dubita cunctas sperare puellas!
Vix erit e multis, quae neget, una tibi.
(1. 341-44)

With this should be compared such passages as:

Penelopen ipsam, persta modo, tempore vinces;
Capta vides sero Pergama, capta tamen.
(1. 477-78)

and:

Reddite depositum, pietas sua foedera servet;
Fraus absit, vacuas caedis habete manus:
Ludite, si sapitis, solas inpune puellas!
Hac magis est una fraude pudenda fides.
Fallite fallentes: ex magna parte profanum
Sunt genus; in laqueos quos posuere cadant!
(1. 641-46)

But in Book 3, when he announces his intention of arming the weaker sex, Ovid imagines one of his audience as objecting:

Dixerit e multis aliquis 'quid virus in anguis
Adicis et rabidae tradis ovile lupae?'

and he answers:

Parcite paucorum diffundere crimen in omnes;
 Spectetur meritis quaeque puella suis!
 Si minor Atrides Helenen, Helenesque sororem
 Quo premat Atrides crimine maior habet,
 Si scelere Oeclides Talaioniae Eriphylae
 Vivus et in vivis ad Styga venit equis,
 Est pia Penelope lustris errante duobus
 Et totidem lustris bella gerente viro.
 Respice Phylaciden et quae comes isse marito
 Fertur et ante annos occubuisse suos;
 Fata Pheretiadae coniunx Pagasaea redemit
 Proque viro uxore funere lata viri.
 'Accipe me, Capaneu! cineres miscebimur' inquit
 Iphias in medios desiluitque rogos.
 Ipsa quoque et cultus et nomine femina
 Virtus:
 Non mirum, populo si placet illa suo.
 Nec tamen hae mentes nostra poscuntur ab arte:
 Conveniunt cumbae vela minora meae.
 Nil nisi lascivi per me discuntur amores:
 Femina praecipiam quo sit amanda modo.
 Femina nec flammis nec saevos discutit arcus;
 Parcior haec video tela nocere viris.
 Saepe viri fallunt, tenerae non saepe puellae
 Paucaeque, si quaeras, crimina fraudis habent.

(3. 9-32)

Now this is quite deliberate. I will resist the temptation to discuss the subsidiary ironies of the individual passages (such as the mention of *Virtus* and the quick recovery with the reminder that he is, after all, teaching women vice), and will comment upon the broad contradiction. We are not asked by Ovid to adjudicate the case; we are asked to admire the ease with which arguments and examples are found for both sides, the ease with which a different *persona* is assumed, and the bravura of the juxtaposition. Each passage embodies that adaptation to the audience which is the most basic principle of rhetoric; the beginning of Book 3 is in fact a transparent *captatio benevolentiae*.²¹

All is unmasked, and thus the audience to which the transparent *captatio* is directed is not the actual readers of the poem, but a fictitious audience,

the appliers of the art who exist in the amoral world of "as if." The actual audience, in the real world, observes and appreciates the sophist's manipulations. We miss the point, then, I feel, if we regard the *Ars* and *Remedia* as anything but an elaborate literary game, and it is for precisely this reason that the *persona*—and the perception of its Protean pretences—is so central to the poem. The reader's awareness of the artificiality, the contrivance, the pretence, and his admiration of the virtuosity of impudent manipulation are the primary intentions of these poems.

Cornell University

NOTES

¹ A. W. Allen, "Elegy and the Classical Attitude toward Love: Propertius I.1," *Yale Classical Studies* 11 (1950) 265; R. Bürger, *De Ovidi carminum amatorum inventionem et arte* (Braunschweig, 1901).

² A. W. Allen, "'Sincerity' and the Roman Elegist," *CP* 45 (1950) 153-56.

³ See L. P. Wilkinson's excellent discussion of the *Amores* in *Ovid Recalled* (Cambridge, 1955) pp. 17-82.

⁴ See, for instance, Martin Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, 3rd ed. (Munich, 1911) part 2, 1st half, pp. 300 ff.; and H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Latin Literature*, 2nd ed. (London, 1949) p. 329.

⁵ Bürger (see note 1) pp. 47-130.

⁶ "Propertius as Praeceptor Amoris," *CP* 5 (1910) 28-40.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁹ "Den Charakter seiner Schöpfung bestimmt Ovid selbst, indem er seine Muse 'locosa' nennt; er will also sein Gedicht als ein Werk des Scherzes aufgefasst wissen; das scherzhafte Charakter aber entsteht dadurch, dass die Hetärenliebe wie eine Wissenschaft behandelt und als solche mit allem Ernste, den etwa eine Behandlung des philosophischen Eros erfordert hätte, vorgetragen wird. In diesem Widerstreit zwischen Form und Inhalt liegt etwas parodisches und heiteres; der Inhalt selbst ist aber, genau genommen, von der Parodie frei!" (Schanz [see note 4] part 2, first half, p. 304). With this last clause I find myself in disagreement.

¹⁰ See A. W. Allen's articles referred to above.

¹¹ Emile Ripert, *Ovide, poète de l'amour, des dieux, et de l'exile* (Paris, 1921). The heroic and "moral" cloaks Ovid throws over the libertinism which is the subject of the *Ars* and the *Amores* are simply further impudencies. See E. K. Rand's delightful discussion in *Ovid and his Influence* (London, 1925).

¹² All citations of Ovid are to the Teubner edi-

tion by R. Ehwald, 5 vols. (Leipzig, 1916).

¹³ Much of the liveliness of the *Ars* in fact springs from this metaphor, by which we seem to watch the course of a liaison, with all its dramatic little scenes. Cf. 1. 39, 63, 771; 2. 9-10, 425, 429; 3. 26, 99-100, 467, 747, 809; *Rem.* 811 ff.

¹⁴ Bürger (p. 50) points out the similarity of lines 133-34 to Propertius 2. 6. 19-22. The verbal similarity is very close, and Ovid clearly had Propertius in mind. Propertius' lines occur, however, in a very different context. He is bitterly inveighing against the corruption prevalent in Rome, while Ovid is celebrating it.

¹⁵ Bürger, p. 52, notes that the theme of the triumph occurs in Propertius 3. 4, and points out several verbal parallels which suggest Ovid had that poem in mind. Like 2. 6, however, 3. 4 offers a sharp contrast to Ovid's passage. Augustus' exploits are taken seriously by Propertius; they are a kind of heroic norm of action with which the lover's *modus vivendi* is contrasted, and to which the *otium* and simplicity of the lover's existence are briefly shown to be preferable—on moral grounds. As H. Krefeld notes (*Liebe, Landleben und Krieg bei Tibull* [Düsseldorf, 1954] pp. 24-25), we have here the frequent contrast

between the *vita militaris* and the *vita erotica*, the former of which "Properz in 3, 4 . . . in allen ihren Erscheinungen grundsätzlich neben die *vita erotica* stellt und lediglich für sich persönlich ablehnt, für andere dagegen voll anerkennt."

¹⁶ Cf. 3. 577-90.

¹⁷ Cf. 2. 537-51; 3. 245-50, 599; *Rem.* 499-500.

¹⁸ Wilkinson (see note 3) pp. 4-12 and notes, and *passim*.

¹⁹ See Bürger, pp. 94-96.

²⁰ See Bürger, pp. 55-58.

²¹ Similar passages are those which attack and defend the present age. In Book 2 Ovid complains that poetry is unregarded and that this is the true Golden Age because money buys everything, including honor and love (275 ff.). But in Book 3 he hymns modern Rome as the acme of brilliance and refinement, echoing his own language of Book 2 (*mus aurea Roma est*), and incidentally poking hilarious fun at the skin-clad Homeric heroes and their rustic wives, impudently raising sophisticated vice above the old Roman virtues Augustus sought to reinstate — *prisca iuvent alios* (107 ff.).

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
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Epitaphs and the Memory

HUGH H. DAVIS

THE PLACE IN Cicero's *Cato Maior De Senectute* 21, where allusion is made to the superstition that reading epitaphs causes a person to lose his memory is as challenging as it has proved baffling to the commentators who have tried to rationalize it.¹ The curious belief is not found elsewhere in classical literature, nor in medieval, and appears to have only a very tenuous tradition, probably academic and possibly derived from the Cicero passage, in modern times.² Necessarily, the absence of parallel references in literature greatly increases the difficulty of explaining the origin of the superstition.

Very appropriately Cicero placed the allusion to the belief on the tongue of Cato the Elder, a thorough-going antiquarian, who for his work, the *Origines*, must have had to read literally hundreds of inscriptions on tombs.

Not only are the words in character for Cato, but, indirectly aimed at Atticus, are certain to have been appreciated by that latter-day antiquarian to whom the treatise on old age is dedicated. Unless he delegated the assignment to some of his learned flunkies

(pedissequi), Atticus must have read even more epitaphs than his beloved Cato—a coincidence seemingly overlooked by the editors—in gathering genealogical data for the *Liber Annalis*, or for that popular, and perhaps somewhat catering series on and for the first families of Rome.³ In fact, he was probably engaged on the latter work in 44 B.C. when Cicero indited the *Cato Maior* for him. Finally, most of the biographical and historical detail with which the dialogue is so heavily larded that the old censor appears to be a veritable encyclopedia of names and dates, is believed due to Atticus' research, deriving from the *Liber Annalis*.⁴

In the passage under discussion, Cato, refuting the charge that the memory necessarily grows weak in old age,⁵ vaunts himself a little by saying that he knows the names not only of the citizens living at that time, but also those of their fathers and grandfathers. Moreover, he adds, in visiting tombs and reading epitaphs, presumably to learn names, he is not afraid of losing his memory, according to the popular belief. On the contrary, by reading epitaphs he refreshes his memory in recalling the dead.

Equidem non modo eos novi, qui sunt, sed eorum patres etiam et avos, nec sepulcra legens vereor, quod aiunt, ne memoriam perdam; his enim ipsis legendis in memoriam redeo mortuorum.

The many commentaries on the above text as well as translations, with which I am acquainted, are exasperatingly scant and unsatisfactory, with one exception noted below. First of all,

Opposite. The title-page of a translation by James Logan, from the first issue of the first edition, printed and sold by Benjamin Franklin. This edition is often considered the best specimen of printing produced by Franklin's press. Photographs by Verne B. Schuman, with the permission of the Indiana University Library.

the editors fail to exploit the full import of Cato's words. *Memoria* is the crucial word, and it is used in two different senses: (1) the mental faculty of the memory, (2) the act of recollecting or recalling something, in this instance evoking, as it were, the persons of the dead. Thus, there is a slight play on the word *memoria*. Only Shuckburgh's edition of the *De Senectute*⁶ recognizes the word play and proper emphasis. The note contains the forceful, even if somewhat bold, translation of the last four words above: "I get a kind of second memory, that namely of the dead." The comment is: "So far from losing memory by reading sepul-

chral inscriptions, I refresh it."

It will be my purpose in the present study to show, first of all, that the superstition in question arises from a common folk belief in the potential malevolence of the dead toward the living. Having done that, I shall propose a theory to explain why the faculty of the memory in the living is the special objective of the malevolence of the dead.

That our superstition arose from a folk belief in the generally baleful influence of the dead, a very substantial argument can be adduced from a comparison of the contexts of *Cato* 21 and *De Finibus* 5. 3, in which there is an allusion to a certain "old proverb." First a brief summary of the introduction to Book 5 of the *De Finibus* is essential as background for the passage in question, and to the proper exposition of my argument.

The dramatic setting of the dialogue is at Athens in the grove of the Academy, where the young students, Cicero, his brother Quintus, their cousin Lucius, and their friends Piso and Atticus, have repaired for a quiet walk at the end of the day. The three Ciceros are impressionable young Romans on their first trip abroad. Piso and the rather blasé Atticus, who was a few years older than his comrades, the Ciceros, had already spent some years in Athens. The idealists, Quintus Cicero and Piso, sentimentalize at great length on the compelling associations that places connected with the life of great historical and literary figures of the past call up in the visitor's mind (*locorum admonitio*).

By extension, the *loca* included also the tombs of the great. Evidence for this is found in young Lucius' remark (*De Fin.* 5. 5). When asked if he subscribed to such a doctrine of place associations, he bashfully confesses that he had gone out of his way a short while before to visit the tomb of Pericles. Pertinent also in this connection is the fact that Plato's tomb, according to Diogenes Laertius (3. 41), was in his

[43]

Grandfathers: Nor when I read over the Inscriptions of the Tombs, do I find I am in Danger of losing mine. I never yet heard of an Old Man that forgot where he had hid his Treasure. The Oldest will remember what engages their Thoughts and Care, as when they give or take Security, with such other Affairs as concern them. How do the Lawyers, the Pontiffs, the Augurs, and the Philosophers, who live to a great Age? What a vast Number of Particulars must all these comprehend in their Memories? Men will retain their Understanding and Abilities, while they continue their Application and Diligence. This we find true, not only in Men of great and publick Characters, but in those also, who have lived a quiet and unactive Life, and spent it only in Study. (32) *Sophocles*

(32) *Sophocles of Athens*, a famous Tragic Poet, is allowed by all to have lived to a great Age, but Authors do not agree in the Length of it. Some say, he died at 87; but I think, without good Grounds. The Author of his Life, prefix'd in Greek to the *Scholia* on him, says he was born the 2d Year of the 71st Olympiad (the 495th Year before Christ) 15 Years before the Birth of *Euripides*, whom he also survived (he says) six Years. That *Euripides* lived seventy-five Years, is particularly proved by

The passage treated by Professor Davis appears at the top of this page in the Franklin edition.

beloved Academy where he had so often walked and talked with his disciples. Doubtless the thought that the philosopher's last resting place was there enhanced even more the romantic associations that the famous grove aroused in the minds of our young Romans.⁷

Each one of the young men mentions the places that especially impress him. Atticus, reflecting, it would seem, on Piso's remark that the Academy evoked for him the grand figure of Plato, enters the conversation in a kind of good-natured spirit of contradiction. He says that in the company of his Epicurean teacher, Phaedrus, he often happens to be in the Gardens of Epicurus, *sed veteris proverbi admonitu vivorum memini*, "but on the advice of the old proverb I remember the living." He means in effect that he takes no stock in sentimentalizing about a dead master, and his associations with that particular place.

From the context, the implication is, if I am not mistaken, that the actual tomb of Epicurus was in the Gardens which he had purchased and later bequeathed to his disciples. It is not, however, necessary to insist on this detail for which I do not find specific confirmation in the sources. Certainly it can be said that Atticus is criticizing an exaggerated cult of the dead that had developed around the memory of Epicurus whose shrine was the famous Gardens.⁸

Now the old saw used by Atticus is found elsewhere only twice: in Petronius 43. 1 and 75. 8. In the first instance it is used with something like its original force. A guest has become a bore at dinner by reason of harping too long on the merits of a deceased friend, and Phileros interjects: "*Vivorum meminerimus*. He has what was coming to him, he had a very nice life and a very nice funeral." Obviously, he desires to end the other guest's lugubrious monologue, and get a chance to talk himself. Since, however, the preceding remarks were

about a dead man, Phileros uses an old saw that is quite appropriate here, as it means in effect, "let's talk no more of the dead! It's bad luck."

In 75. 8 the expression means more than just "let's change the subject," as some commentators would have it. Trimalchio and his wife Fortunata have had a battle royal with the guests as spectators. At the end of a long string of abusive language, Trimalchio, wishing to spare his guests further so unedifying a spectacle, rounds off his words with what is at once a signal that he is changing the subject to a happier one, and also in effect the most scathing insult that he could offer his spouse. He is declaring to his guests that in his eyes Fortunata is as good as dead, and it is unlucky to mention her further.

Now in the light of the preceding discussion it is clear, I believe, that although in later, more sophisticated times the old saw probably had little more force than signaling a desire to change the subject of conversation, it actually derives from a folk belief that it is unlucky to have the names of the dead forever on one's tongue, recalling them, as it were, to life. Moreover, even though employed in a mock-serious fashion the "old proverb" of *De Fin.* 5. 3 connotes clearly, in my opinion, the potentiality of the dead for working harm upon the living.

With this background we turn now to the argument. A number of points of similarity in the above passage with *Cato* 21 should be noted. Recollection occasioned by the sight of actual places is treated in both passages. The grove of the Academy re-creates for Piso the figure of Plato, and he observes that so great is the power of suggestion inherent in places that advisedly the science of memorization is based on "backgrounds" (*loci*).⁹ The tombs that Cato visits cause him to recall specific dead citizens and their times.

Atticus figures in both passages. In *De Fin.* 5 he is a young man, a character in the dialogue itself. In the *Cato*

he is not only the dedicatee, but also, if I am not mistaken, is symbolized by Cato himself in Section 21 and elsewhere because of his antiquarian pursuits. Further cogency is lent the symbolism by Atticus' intense interest in the life of Cato, a fellow historian. It was at his express wish that Nepos wrote a definitive life of the Censor (Cato 3. 5).

In the earlier dialogue Atticus, a somewhat cynical young man, affects a "contra-antiquarian" point of view.¹⁰ He might be compared to a modern young sophisticate who will give no lip-service to the past. In the later dialogue Atticus/Cato has a healthy respect for the past, its traditions, and its monuments. The young man is now an old man. Besides, the genealogy business is good, and family trees have borne for him abundant fruit.

In *De Fin.* 5. 3 the young Atticus speaks flippantly about the idea of the *locorum admonitio*.¹¹ He says in effect: "It's bad luck to talk about the dead. Besides, I couldn't forget Epicurus if I wanted to, for our friends have his picture not only on their living room walls, but even on their beer steins and class rings!" In Cato 21 the implication is that Atticus/Cato is all in favor of the doctrine of the *locorum admonitio*.

We come now to the final point of similarity between the two passages being compared. An old saw involving a popular superstition is facetiously invoked against the doctrine of the *locorum admonitio* by the young Atticus in his debunking efforts. A popular superstition is facetiously said to be defied by the old Atticus/Cato in his antiquarian pursuits. He gains memory, does not lose it—by reason of *locorum admonitio*. Of course, it is in keeping with the Epicurean creed, to which the real Atticus subscribed, that its adherents should not be frightened by superstitions, rather that they should scorn them. Hence, such tongue-in-cheek exploitation of com-

mon superstitions is doubly effective on the lips of the Epicurean Atticus.

In view, therefore, of the many analogies between these two passages, I submit that the superstition alluded to in Cato 21 necessarily concerns the baleful influence of the dead.

In addition to other reasons, but perhaps chiefly because there was so little belief in the immortality of the soul in an after-life, a tremendous significance was attached to the last resting place for the mortal remains of a human being. The Manes, or Shades of the dead, have great power to work weal or woe in the living. There being uncertainty, however, as to what they will do to you, it is better to stay away entirely from tombs, at once the shrines and abodes of the Manes, excepting, of course, the graves of your family, to which you owe the debt of *pietas*. Photius approximates the idea very closely in defining *kreittones*, "The Better Race," a euphemism for the dead: "The dead. They seem to be harmful. Therefore, let those persons who pass by tombs keep silent."¹² A German superstition in proverb form has almost the same idea: "Never call the dead by name or you may cry them up."¹³

The name of a dead man is the only vestige of his personality and onetime entity as a living being that he continues to possess, as it were, even in the grave. Perhaps, then, reading epitaphs, for in ancient times reading normally meant *viva voce*, you run the risk of doing the very thing warned against.

Having established that the superstition takes its rise from a folk belief in the potential malevolence of the dead toward the living, can we further determine why it is the faculty of the memory that is the particular objective of this malevolence? Here I should like to propose a theory suggested by Cato's play on the word *memoria*, which has already been noted.

Tombs with their epitaphs are indeed a brave attempt to preserve the

memoria of the departed against "the tooth of time and razure of oblivion." From the Augustan Age on, the word itself was often employed in sepulchral inscriptions.¹⁴

Beside the figurative meaning of establishing the cult, as it were, of someone's memory, the grave-stone itself, and more especially the commemorative inscription on it, would seem to be singled out by the common formula *memoriam posuit* (or *fecit*) and the name of the person erecting the monument. Just as often *memoria* occurs without a verb at the beginning of the text in any one of several cases, and with or without the preposition *in*, and is generally followed by the name of the person commemorated in the genitive. Our current formula, in *memoriam*, derives, of course, from this usage. Sometimes the word is coupled to the normal Augustan incipit for a funerary inscription, thus giving the dedication *dis manibus et memoriae*. In the latter instance the word appears almost like a personified abstraction of memory, or even the genius of the dead person whose name follows. Occasionally the qualification *bonae memoriae* is used to describe the departed, a practice extended and popularized by the Christians in later times, e.g., *beatae memoriae*. In patristic times *memoria* actually became a common synonym for *sepulcrum* and *tumulus*.

Now all the emphasis in *Cato* 21 on *memoria* in a context with so many connotations of death hints at, I believe, the origin of the superstition under discussion. The opposite of *memoria* is its antonym *oblivio*, the reverse, as it were, of the same coin. Like the former it is a word capable of both subjective and objective meanings: (1) weakness and loss of memory, forgetfulness; (2) oblivion, a state of forgetfulness and neglect attaching to persons, places and things, especially to the dead.¹⁵ Since these meanings of *oblivio*, as we shall see, were closely associated in Roman popular belief with the dead, is it so remarkable that a

superstition involving the first meaning of that word should be attached to the living who frequent tombs?

The dead are they who, as Vergil so poignantly tells us (*Aen.* 6. 714-15), drink at Lethe's stream long draughts of sweet forgetfulness of their troubled earthly lives. The concept, however, is by no means original with Vergil, but has its roots deep in the Orphic and popular religion of the Greeks and Romans. The early topography of Hades calls Lethe a plain, and the earliest reference in extant literature is, interestingly enough, a humorous one from Aristophanes' *Frogs*. The dramatist, of course, would never have made use of the idea unless he was sure that his audience was well acquainted with it. In a manner suggesting to me that of the rascally coachman in Collodi's *Pinocchio* who lured the boys to climb aboard for the land of Cocagne, that doughty boatman Charon lustily calls: "Who's for a let-up of all troubles and woes? Who's for the Plain of Lethe?"¹⁶

A little later, Plato graphically depicts this same Plain of Lethe as being watered by the River of Unmindfulness¹⁷ from which the spirits of the dead quaff forgetfulness. In later ancient literature the term Lethe is applied to the River itself. It is of this water that an early Greek epigram taken from a stone so appropriately says: *pausiponon láthas póma*, "a draught of Lethe, surcease of all ills."¹⁸ Let these examples suffice to indicate in some measure how deeply ingrained in the folk belief was the idea of the forgetfulness of the dead.

Even more significant is the grim fact that with burial the dead are consigned to oblivion, that is, to the great sea of nothingness, and to forgetfulness on the part of the living. In fact, Varro quotes an archaic liturgical formula used at solemn funerals in his day, *ollus leto datus est*. Our lexicographer then derives *letum*, the common synonym of *mors*, from the Greek *lé-the*, that is, oblivion, forgetfulness.¹⁹ This derivation, according to modern ety-

mologists, is probably not correct, but, none the less, the fact that Varro and Pompeius Festus make such an association of ideas seems to point to a prevailing popular etymology and hence folk belief.

Whether they be pompous monuments or plain stones with a simple legend, memorials for the dead are but a pathetic and eventually futile effort to counteract the forgetfulness that attends them on all sides. *Lividae obliviones*²⁰ gnaw away at both marble and memory. The evil wood of a sterile fig tree suffices to rend asunder a tomb with its proud epitaph, as Juvenal (10. 143-46) graphically puts it, and even sepulchres are destined to endure only their allotted time (*data sunt ipsis quoque fata sepulchris*).

Even while the monuments endure, the living often pass them by without bothering to read so much as the name of the deceased. The vainglorious Trimalchio, fearing such a fate, took, as he thought, the proper preventive measure. He arranged with his friend Habinnas, a first-rate tombstone cutter, for a sundial to be erected on his tomb in such a way that a passer-by, wishing to know the hour, would be compelled to read his proud name.²¹

Most persons, however, could not afford to furnish the public such a courtesy as the correct time, in order to insure that their name would be remembered. They had to limit themselves to a plain stone and a short inscription. This was all the more reason why they often called attention to their humble graves by earnestly entreating—sometimes almost frantically commanding—the passer-by to stop and read: *Hospes, siste gradum et perlege*. Among the earliest Roman sepulchral inscriptions, in addition to the simple *tituli sepulcrales* with only the deceased's name, are many of this type, and the tradition has been a constant one, of course, and vouched for in Christian epitaphs even down into the last century.

Often the passer-by is reminded in the best *memento mori* tradition that the dead person was once just as vibrant with life as he is now. Often too at the end of the epitaph the *viator* is given the good wishes of the dead, and told to continue on his way. The dead wished only a moment of his time, no more than a passing thought. Relatively seldom are curses inscribed, and then generally intended only for vandals who would desecrate tombs.

Nevertheless, the superstitiously inclined, in my opinion, might regard the frenzied entreaties of the dead to the living to stop and read, as baleful. You are taking orders from the dead if you stop and read to the end of the epitaph. For so long a time, at least, you are under the spell, as it were, of the Manes or Shades of the person buried there. In reading, moreover, the name of the dead, perhaps you evoke his Manes heretofore quiet. Texts and reading are part and parcel of magic rites and charms. And who knows if the spell can be broken at the end of the epitaph? In some such way as this, I suggest, the superstition arose that it is unlucky to read epitaphs. Now, if the dead are conceived of as being forgetful of their earthly life by reason of the Lethe-draught, and, moreover, as having been at death dedicated or committed to the great realm of oblivion, that is, forgetfulness, does it not seem plausible that they may infect the living who delay to read epitaphs, baleful formulae, with the contagion of forgetfulness?

After having reached the above conclusions based on the text of Cicero, I was gratified to discover in an unexpected quarter, the Babylonian Talmud,²² the same superstition treated in this study, and in effect strong support for the general character of my thesis. From what follows it will be abundantly clear that the curious belief arises from fear of the dead.

In the tractate of *Horayoth* (Decisions), after a number of popular be-

liefs are mentioned regarding the loss of memory as well as recipes for the recovery thereof, appears a list (13b) of ten things that "adversely affect one's memorizing study." The last two items have this in common, that the superstitions take their rise in fear of the dead. They are in order: "drinking from a streamlet that runs through a graveyard, and looking into the face of a corpse." Immediately is subjoined the following sentence: "Others say reading the inscriptions upon graves."

It is interesting and significant that these warnings against loss of memory and things that "adversely affect one's memorizing study" are directed to youths and students. "Since the most honoured class in the community were scholars, a retentive memory was highly prized. That superstitions should have accumulated on the subject is therefore to be expected."²³

The superstition recorded in the Talmud, although it might be called, I believe, a student's superstition, would hardly seem to derive from Cicero's text. It is more probable to assume that both Cicero and the Talmud reflect the same folk belief,²⁴ which is a vestige of primitive belief in the potential malevolence of the dead toward the living.

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NOTES

¹ For the principal theories, see Ascensius (*Martii Tullii Ciceronis . . . de Officiis, Amicitia: Senectute & paradoxis . . .* Jodoci Badii Ascensii textus explanatione . . . [Lyons, 1511] fol. cccxvii) and C. E. Bennett (*M. Tullii Ciceronis Cato Maior De Senectute* [Chicago, 1913] p. 60) who make the validity of the superstition depend on the physical and mental condition of the epitaph readers, viz., they are generally old men with failing memories; Paulus Manutius (*Martii Tullii Ciceronis Officiorum libri tres. Cato maior vel de senectute . . .* Paulus Manutius Aldi f., [Venice, 1545] nota marg. ad loc.) who attributes the belief to the mental confusion sometimes resulting from reading too large an aggregation of names at one time; E. S. Shuckburgh (*Cato Maior, A Dialogue on Old Age by M. Tullius Cicero* [London, 1886; repr. 1952] p. 66) who, turning his attention to the writing on the stones instead of to the disposition of the reader, sug-

gests that its origin may be connected with the early prejudice against writing as harmful to the memory, from causing it to be less used (cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 274-75); K. F. W. Wander (*Deutsches Sprichwörter Lexikon* [Leipzig, 1867-80] vol. 2, p. 119) and later A. Otto (*Die Sprichwörter . . . der Römer* [Leipzig, 1890] pp. 218-19) who really beg the question by remarking that so long as one reads epitaphs he forgets the present in recalling the dead; and E. Arens ("Aberglaube an Gräbern," *NJbb* 49 [1922] 457) who suggests the primitive belief, reflected in later folklore, that the dead even in the grave have power to harm the living. With this concept my specific theory about loss of memory from epitaph-reading is not discordant.

² Arens (see note 1) suspects the modern superstition, which Ernst Meier (*Deutsche Sagen . . . aus Schwaben*, vol. 2 [Stuttgart, 1852] p. 515) noted in Bretten near Baden, to have an artificial, learned tradition deriving in some way or other from the text of the *Cato Maior*. For the occurrence of this superstition in the Talmud, see the conclusion of this article.

³ Nepos, *Att.* 13. 3; 18. 24.

⁴ A. H. Byrne, *Titus Pomponius Atticus, Chapters of a Biography* (Bryn Mawr College Dissertation, 1920) p. 43 and references.

⁵ Another interesting analogy here is Atticus' remarkable memory. Cicero pays tribute to it in *De Leg.* 2. 45.

⁶ See note 1.

⁷ Cf. *Cic. De Fin.* 5. 2: cuius etiam illi propinqui hortuli non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsam videntur in conspectu meo ponere. Is this not a reference to the actual tomb of Plato?

⁸ Cf. *De Fin.* 2. 101 concerning Epicurus' provision in his last will and testament for an annual commemoration of his birthday as well as a monthly banquet of his disciples for the purpose of keeping his memory green. Cf. *Plin. N. H.* 35. 5.

⁹ *De Fin.* 5. 2. Cf. *Auctor ad Heren.* 3. 29-32.

¹⁰ Antiquarianism was one of the two purposes served by the *locorum admonitio*, as is evident from Piso's words in *De Fin.* 5. 6: *sin tantum modo ad indicia veteris memoriae cognoscenda, curiosiorum.*

¹¹ For a decided change of heart in Atticus regarding this very matter of Epitaphs, see *Ad Fam.* 13. 1. 5. Atticus campaigns for the preservation of the house once occupied by the master.

¹² *Is.* 9. 4. 19; cf. also Rohde, *Psyche* (Eng. trans.) chap. 5, n. 110.

¹³ Jacob Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, 4th ed. (Berlin, 1875-78) vol. 3, p. 463, no. 830.

¹⁴ Cf. *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, s.v. "memoria," with references to *CIL*.

¹⁵ Cf. Forcellini, *Lexicon totius Latinitatis*, s.v. "oblivio"; Stephanus, *Thes. Ling. Graec.*, s.v. "lé-the"; Forcellini, *Onomasticon*, s.v. "Lethe"; Roscher, *Lexikon . . . Mythologie*, s.v. "Lethe."

¹⁶ *Frogs* 185-86.

¹⁷ Plato, *Rep.* 10. 621a.

¹⁸ Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca Ex Lapidibus Conlecta* (Berlin, 1878) no. 244. 10.

¹⁹ *L. L.* 7. 42; Paul. ex Fest. 115. 9.

²⁰ *Hor. Odes* 4. 9. 33-34.

²¹ Petr. 71. 11.

²² No editor or commentator on Cato 21 appears to have noticed the place in the Talmud. C. K. Dillaway, however, in his edition *De Senectute and De Amicitia*, 5th ed. (Philadelphia, 1850) pp. 115-16, unwittingly came close to the passage by consulting secondary sources. This is evident from his note: "*Sepulcra legens* . . . A similar opinion seems to have prevailed among the Jews; for we are told in Buxtorf's 'Religious Customs and Ceremonies of the Jews,' subjoined to Stehelin's Rabbinical Literature, v. ii, p. 359, 'The party being dead, his mouth and eyes are immediately closed, and his face is covered; and no one ventures afterward to look fully at it, because to look upon the face of a dead person is deemed destructive of memory.'"

Arens (see note 1) also inadvertently came near the Talmud passage when he quoted from a quaint poem by Heinrich Freimuth in *Aachens Dichter und Prosaisten*, vol. 3, p. 491: "Es mahnten die Rabbinen: 'Soll nicht dein Geist

erkranken./ So lies nicht Leichensteine. —/ Es tötet die Gedanken!// Der Römer schloss die Augen/ Bedacht vor Epitaphen./ Dass sein Gedächtnis nimmer/ Allda mög' auch entschlafen.'" To the second stanza Arens has appended a footnote to the effect that the verses are certainly a playful elaboration of our Cicero passage.

The codification of the Babylonian Talmud was not completed before the 6th century A.D. The saying comes from the Haggadah or folklore, and is in the Aramaic language, and like much of the Haggadah was probably borrowed from a people with whom the Jews came in contact.

²³ Abraham Cohen, *Everyman's Talmud* (New York, 1943) p. 315.

²⁴ It appears that the same folk belief exists among the Moslem Metawile in Syria. Cf. Bernhard Stern, *Medizin, Aberglaube und Geschlechtsleben in der Türkei*, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1903) p. 222: "wird man vergesslich . . . Wenn man häufig Inschriften auf alten Gräbern liest."

Announcements

CANE Meeting

The 52nd Annual Meeting of the Classical Association of New England will be at Williams College, March 28-29. The officers for 1957-58 are: President, Norman L. Hatch, Phillips Exeter Academy; Vice-President, Grace A. Crawford, Hartford (Conn.) Public High School; Secretary-Treasurer, Claude W. Barlow, Clark University. Additional members of the Executive Committee: Edith S. Pitt, Deering High School, Portland, Me.; C. Arthur Lynch, Brown University; Elizabeth S. Evans, Connecticut College for Women; Rev. Leo P. McCauley, S.J., Boston College.

Kent State Workshop

The Seventh Annual High School Foreign Language Teachers' Workshop will be held at Kent State University, Kent, Ohio, on March 1, 1958. For information, please write to the Director of the Workshop, Dr. Charles F. Kirk, Kent State University.

Battle Fellowship

The Department of Classical Languages of The University of Texas is offering for 1958-59 the Battle Fellowship in Greek Studies with a stipend of \$1500. This fellowship is open to graduate students who are candidates for a degree with a major in Greek. Applications should be sent to Professor H. J. Leon, Chairman, University of Texas, Austin 12, before March 1, 1958.

New England Workshop

The Third New England Latin Workshop will be held at Tufts University, June 30 to July 18, 1958. The Director will be Professor Van L. Johnson. Mr. John K. Colby of Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass., will teach the central course. Among the lecturers will be Dr. Goodwin B. Beach of Trinity College and Dr. Grace Crawford of the Hartford (Conn.) Public High School. Announcement concerning registration will be made about March 1.

Descent to the Underworld in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*

WADE C. STEPHENS

Nur wer die Leier schon hob
auch unter Schatten,
darf das unendliche Lob
ahnend erstatten.

Rilke, *Sonnets to Orpheus* 1. 9

THE LINES QUOTED above show the continuing vitality and literary usefulness of the myth of Orpheus, who lost his wife, descended to Hades in search of her, and, although briefly, won her back from the gods of death by the power of his song. The story is capable of a great variety of treatments; the poet may emphasize whatever elements in it he wishes and point up, as did the Greeks and Romans, several significant meanings implicit in the myth. The present study, confining itself largely to Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, will consider this poet's use of the theme of descent to the Underworld (*catabasis*), especially in the story of Orpheus.

The *Metamorphoses* has long suffered from the illusion of its readers that it is little more than a collection of stories told for their own sake—in short, a versified handbook of mythology. Ovid, it is admitted, contributed a clever and exceedingly complex framework as well as a characteristically light and witty touch. But, curiously enough, although almost all of the great myths are included in the poem, there is not supposed to be any significant meaning to be found in it. The stories have seemed to be mere shells. In recent years a counter-current to this view has been running

strongly, and it may be enough to cite Rand, Otis, and Fränkel, who have gone far to open our eyes to serious purpose in the *Metamorphoses*.¹

Any full estimate of the poem must take into account the two philosophical passages which frame the myths (1. 5-88 and 15. 75-478). The first of these passages is an account of creation, in which many Stoic features are combined with ideas derived from Empedocles and the writers who are commonly supposed to reflect the Orphic cosmology.² The latter passage is spoken by Pythagoras, a philosopher not without his connections to Empedocles and the Orphics, whose influence is again mingled with Stoicism in the speech. The main feature of these lines is the insistence on immortality through metempsychosis, and we shall return to discuss this matter.

The presence of these philosophical elements, and their placing at beginning and end of the poem, would seem to indicate that Ovid has more than sheer entertainment in mind. Whatever their connection to the body of the work, in these places Ovid is serious. And perhaps the reader would be well advised to follow the hint, to see what Ovid meant by introducing philosophy into this sophisticated and amusing résumé of the old myths and legends.

It has already been mentioned that the philosophy has affinities to Orphism. This is a word not lightly to be thrown about, and definition of the term must be given. It is here taken

to refer to a belief (whether held by an organized group or not does not matter) in the immortality of the human soul, opposed to the mortal body in which it is confined, in purification and often punishment after death, in a cycle of reincarnations, and hence in vegetarianism as a way of life. Eros, or Phanes as he is often called, was considered by the Orphics to be the oldest god, creator of all, and in the philosophy of Empedocles this conception is intellectualized in the force *philôtês*.

In the *Metamorphoses* Ovid loses little time in moving toward an Orphic presentation of his material. Lines 5-88 of Book 1 find parallels in the parabasis of Aristophanes' *Birds*, Orpheus' song in Apollonius' *Argonautica* (1. 496-502), and in the *testimonia* on Pythagoras. The presence of Empedoclean influence has been noted above, and, still in Book 1, Ovid again draws upon the Sicilian for his account of the repopulation of the world after the deluge (1. 416-37). Immediately thereafter comes a most important passage where Cupid (the Greek Eros or Phanes) asserts his authority over Apollo (1. 463-65):

filius huic Veneris "figat tuus omnia,
Phoebe,
te meus arcus" ait. "quantoque animalia
cedunt
cuncta deo, tanto minor est tua gloria
nostra."

The rest of the Apollo and Daphne story backs up Cupid's claim, for Apollo is forced to admit his inferiority (1. 519-20):

certa quidem nostra est, nostra tamen una
sagitta
certior, in vacuo quae vulnera pectore
fecit.

Apollo's usual powers are of no avail against Cupid (1. 523-24):

ei mihi, quod nullis amor est sanabilis
herbis
nec prosunt domino, quae prosunt omni-
bus, artes.

In the first love story of the poem, almost the first story of all, Ovid has gone out of his way to introduce Cupid and to show him as supreme among all the gods.

That this is no accident is affirmed by the fact that at regular intervals the idea recurs: in Books 5 and 10 of the 15-book poem. The occurrence in Book 10 will be discussed below, in connection with Orpheus. The idea appears in Book 5 in much the same way as it did in Book 1. The rape of Proserpina was very important in Orphic mythology;³ indeed, the version which Ovid uses in the *Metamorphoses* seems to be characteristically Orphic.⁴ Here, too, Ovid introduces Cupid, and the association seems to be fully intentional, for no other account of Proserpina's rape mentions Cupid as a leading figure. A significant passage gives us the motivation; Venus is addressing her son (5. 366, 369-72):

illa quibus superas omnes cape tela, Cupido, . . .

tu superos ipsumque Iovem, tu numina
ponti
victa domas ipsumque, regit qui numina
ponti.

Tartara quid cessant? cur non matrisque
tuumque
imperium profers? agitur pars tertia mun-
di, . . .

Again the god is successful, and after the double demonstration of his power we are entitled to take his supremacy as proved.

This lengthy preface has been necessary to set forth the indications that Ovid was working with materials of the type here called Orphic and that he did so in such a way that they keep their significance. Books 1, 5, and 15 have been mentioned; it is no accident that it is to Book 10 that we now turn, to consider the figure of Orpheus himself. Ovid does not skimp here; the bard occupies more than an entire book with his story and his song (10. 1-11. 66).

The key-note in Ovid's account of Orpheus' life is the loss of Eurydice. Hymen is summoned by the "voice of Orpheus" (10. 3) to the marriage rites, but a series of ill omens is followed by the bride's fatal encounter with a snake (10. 10). Orpheus mourned her in the upper world and then (10. 12-16):

ne non temptaret et umbras,
ad Styga Taenaria est ausus descendere
porta
perque leves populos simulacraque functa
sepulchro
Persephonen adiit inamoenaque regna
tenentem
umbrarum dominum . . .

Ovid sets the scene with great skill, quietly introducing two motifs which are to be of great subsequent importance. Twice he uses the word *umbrae* in referring to the shades or ghosts of the Underworld; it will be seen below how this use of the word provides a background for Orpheus' longer song. Another theme is barely suggested by the word *inamoena*, "unlovely." We have mentioned the importance of love in Orphism, and the main appeal of the first song, as well as the subject of the second, is to be the power of love. Even in these "unlovely" regions, the Orphic deity rules (10. 29):

vos (sc. Proserpina and Dis) quoque iunxit
Amor.

The song with which Orpheus wins back his bride is of considerable interest. He promises to tell the truth (*vera loqui*, 10. 20), and simply (*positis ambagibus*, 10. 19). He makes clear that his mission is a peaceful one; compare *Aeneid* 6. 399-402, where Norden thinks that Vergil is influenced by an earlier *catabasis* of Orpheus.⁵ Turning to the story of Proserpina's rape, which has been told in Book 5, Orpheus explains his inability to resist Amor, who had also conquered the infernal gods (10. 26-29). Fränkel notes the effect of the plea (10. 29-30):

per ego haec loca plena timoris,

per Chaos hoc ingens vastique silentia
regni,

as "a very human voice, tender and melodious, makes itself heard over the horror and silence of Death's vast realm."⁶ At last he makes his request, in a line of simple beauty (10. 31):

Eurydices, oro, properata retexite fata.

In the remainder of the song, Orpheus acknowledges the power of the Underworld and its gods, to whom all mortals must finally come. Even Eurydice must be given up again, Orpheus knows, but he begs to be granted *usus*⁷ of her until that time, as a gift (10. 37). He closes with a refusal, unique among accounts of descent to the Underworld, a refusal to return to the world of the living and resume his life. Love is victorious over the fear of death, and for the second time the words of 10. 26, *vicit Amor*, hold true.

But their full validity is yet to be shown. For the powers of Hades are softened by the pathos of the song (10. 45-47):

tum primum lacrimis victarum carmine
fama est
Eumenidum maduisse genas, nec regia
coniunx
sustinet oranti nec, qui regit ima, negare.

The observation of Mlle. Desport is as true for Ovid's version of the tale as it is for Vergil: "Dans le mythe d'Orphée et d'Eurydice, tel que Virgile l'a traité, . . . l'amour d'Eurydice et la puissance des *carmina* sont indissolubles."⁸ The skilfulness of the song and the power of love combine to gain Eurydice's restoration to life.

Even now Amor is not done conquering. On the upward journey Orpheus is overcome by love, turns back for a glimpse of his wife, and so loses her once more. The irony of the situation and the motivation of Orpheus are set forth in the line (10. 61):

. . . quid enim nisi se quereretur amatam?

It is commonly supposed that this is

the end of the story of Orpheus and Eurydice, as it is in Vergil (*Georgics* 4. 454-527). But Ovid delicately reflects the story in his setting for Orpheus' second song. The bard,⁹ driven back in his attempt to reenter Hades, goes to sing on a hill in Thrace. *Umbra loco deerat* (10. 88), Ovid tells us. But when Orpheus begins to sing, *umbra loco venit* (10. 90). The word *umbra*, which occurs ten times in Book 10 and no more than six in any other, has a double reference. Its denotation is of trees cutting off the sunlight when they come to hear the song. But its connotation is influenced by Orpheus' just-completed visit to the Underworld, and conveys an overtone of "ghost." Because Eurydice was not with Orpheus (*umbra loco deerat*), he was dispirited, but when he sings of love, her ghost appears (*umbra loco venit*). We have a parallel to the visit to Hades; again Orpheus wins back his wife, although for a short time, by his art.

There are other *catabases* which are important in the structure of the *Metamorphoses*. Proserpina's, mentioned above, is similar to that of Orpheus in that love provides the motive for each. This power, so strong over Proserpina in Book 5, has lost none of its force in Book 10, when she yields to Orpheus' song. Further discussion of the *catabasis* of Proserpina, or of Juno,¹⁰ is outside the scope of this study, for the event has not the same meaning for a god as for a human.

The descent of which Ovid makes the least is that of Hercules. This hero has a very prominent place in the poem; his life and apotheosis seem to convey much of what Ovid intends the *Metamorphoses* to mean.¹¹ Modern scholarship inclines to the view that Hercules' labor of securing the Hesperides' golden apples has significance as the winning of immortality,¹² but the ancient world seems to have been unaware of this. Safer evidence for Ovid's account of Hercules' relation to Hades and immortality is the trip in search of Cerberus, which is mentioned twice (7.

410 and 9. 185). In the first passage the entrance to Hades is described; the second is a bare reference to the deed. But often a *catabasis* is the prelude to an apotheosis, and at the time of Hercules' death his victories over the Underworld are adduced as evidence of his coming immortality (9. 250):

omnia qui vicit, vincet, quos cernitis,
ignes.

Hercules, as the great Stoic hero, symbolizes in the mythological part of the poem the Stoic philosophy of the didactic passages in Books 1 and 15, just as Orpheus represents the Orphic strand in the philosophy employed by Ovid.

The *catabasis* of Aeneas is told more fully than that of Hercules. But Ovid, following the outline of Vergil's account, covers the ground with great speed, as was his custom when competing with his great predecessor. Where Amor had motivated the descent of Orpheus, it is now the hero's *virtus* that makes the journey possible (14. 113):

in via virtuti nulla est via.

The Golden Bough is here (14. 113-14), and, as in Vergil, it serves as the hero's key to the Underworld (14. 116-19):

paruit Aeneas et formidabilis Orci
vidit opes atavosque suos umbramque
senilem
magnanimi Anchisae; didicit quoque iura
locorum,
quaeque novis essent adeunda pericula
bellis.

These lines offer little that is not in Vergil; indeed, all that they tell us is what of the riches in *Aeneid* 6 most attracted Ovid. More to our purpose are Aeneas' words to the Sibyl as they are returning (14. 124-26):

numinis instar eris semper mihi, meque
fatebor
muneris esse tui, quae me loca mortis adire,
quae loca me visae voluisti evadere mortis.

Aeneas regards the Sibyl as a savior from death, and therefore divine. Although she denies that she is a god-

dess, it is undoubtedly her powers derived from the gods which enable her to act as Aeneas' guide. In this sense, she has a derivative divinity, so to speak, as must all saviors from death.

There is another significant side to the *catabasis* of Aeneas. Norden's study of the sources of *Aeneid* 6 has shown that Vergil made use of two earlier poems which described the descents of Orpheus and Hercules, respectively. If this is correct, an important conclusion may be drawn about the *Metamorphoses*. Here, in the account of Aeneas' *catabasis*, Ovid is summarizing Vergil and therefore is using, at least indirectly, these same two poems. And it is the figures of Orpheus and Hercules who, in the *Metamorphoses*, form a kind of double pivot about which the thought of the poem moves, for these two figures bring to a focus the philosophical thought contained and implied in the Orphic and Stoic philosophy of Books 1 and 15.

A final *catabasis* to be considered is that of Aesculapius. Like Orpheus (10. 167 and 11. 8), Aesculapius is the son of Apollo (2. 628). His importance in the poem is not limited to his *catabasis* (foretold in 2. 646-48) and his apotheosis, but is enhanced by the fact that his story links the beginning and end of the *Metamorphoses*, being begun in 2. 626-54 and finished in 15. 624-744.

It is worthwhile to notice some of Aesculapius' many connections with Orpheus and Hercules. The chorus of Euripides' *Alcestis* (965-71), searching for ways to counteract the power of death, can think of two great figures, Orpheus and Asclepius. Hercules was said to have built Asclepius a temple in return for treatment of a wound (Pausanias 3. 19. 7). Pindar calls Asclepius "the hero who gave help in all kinds of diseases," (*Pyth.* 3. 7), just as the Hesiodic *Shield of Hercules* calls its hero "the preserver of good and enterprising men from ruin" (28-29). Edelstein comments: "Perhaps it

was thought that Asclepius had been begotten by Apollo, the 'savior from death' (Hesiod, fr. 194 Rzsch), to be a helper in disease, just as Heracles had been begotten by Zeus to be a liberator from the distress that is the lot of mortals."¹³ As was natural for a healing god, Aesculapius himself was regarded as a savior from death: "But note that Asclepius, unlike Heracles, Orpheus, or Dionysus, does not save from death by a *catabasis* . . . but rather through his medical art."¹⁴

But in Ovid, Aesculapius does indeed go to the Underworld, as was prophesied at his birth (2. 643-48):

tibi se mortalia saepe
corpora debebunt, animas tibi reddere
ademptas
fas erit, idque semel dis indignantibus
ausus,
posse dare hoc iterum flamma prohibebere
avita,
eque deo corpus fies exsangue deusque,
qui modo corpus eras, et bis tua fata nova-
bis.

The crime for which Aesculapius is to be killed is defiance of the gods, restoring to life those whom the gods had punished by death. A good example of this is given in the Hippolytus story (another case of one who, like Aesculapius, dies and is brought back to life as a god). In Ovid, Hippolytus-Virbius says (15. 531-35, 543-46):

vidi quoque luce carentia regna
et lacerum fovi Phlegethontide corpus in
unda,
nec nisi Apollineae valido medicamine pro-
lis
reddita vita foret; quam postquam fortibus
herbis
atque ope Paeonia Dite indignante recepi
...
"qui" que "fuisti
Hippolytus," dixit, "nunc idem Virbius
esto."
hoc nemo inde colo de disque minoribus
unus
numine sub dominae lateo atque accenseor
illi.

It may be remarked that Hippolytus figures prominently in the Pythagorean

basilica,¹⁵ and that he is connected with Pythagoras' pupil Numa in *Fasti* 3. 265-80. Ovid again tells the story of Aesculapius' restoring Hippolytus to life in *Fasti* 6. 735-62, where he adds a significant epilogue about Aesculapius' own resurrection (6. 761-62):

Phoebe, querebaris; deus est, placare parenti;
propter te, fieri quod vetat, ipse facit.

The meaning of the couplet is that Jupiter restored the punished Aesculapius to life, when he had forbidden him to do the same for Hippolytus.

The Aesculapius story in Book 15 of the *Metamorphoses* is placed near the speech of Pythagoras, the only non-mythological figure in the poem who may be said to have experienced *catabasis*. In 15. 160-61 Pythagoras remembers his former existence:

ipse ego (nam memini) Troiani tempore belli
Panthoides Euphorbus eram. . . .

Here we find the mythological and the philosophical brought together; the didactic speech repeats a leading theme of the narrative section. And in the lines which follow immediately upon Pythagoras' statement of his recollection, the fundamental note of the poem is struck (15. 165-68):

omnia mutantur, nihil interit. errat et illinc
huc venit, hinc illuc, et quoslibet occupat artus
spiritus eque feris humana in corpora transit
inque feras noster, nec tempore deperit ullo.

Ovid's position is now explicit: the cycle of metamorphoses is to be related to the idea of immortality and salvation from death. *Omnia mutantur, nihil interit*—behind the appearances of the world about us, the soul lives forever (15. 158-59):

morte carent animae semperque priore relicta
sede novis domibus vivunt habitantque receptae.

Wilkinson acutely remarks: "Lucretius had said of corporeal things, *omnia mutantur, nihil interit*; Pythagoras says it of the soul."¹⁶ And the whole tendency of the *Metamorphoses* is to oppose the Lucretian position, not only in a few lines of explicit philosophizing, but in the subtle patterns of theme and imagery throughout the work. The phrase *volucres animae* (15. 457), for example, recalls the story of the phoenix (15. 393-407), which is thus seen to be a parable on the soul, rising to new life from the ashes of an earlier death. Life is perpetuated; Lycaon pays eternal punishment even after losing his human form, and Hyacinthus remains a symbol of his youthful loveliness.

It is in the myths of *catabasis* that this tendency is most prominent. The victors over death become immortal with but one exception—and the exception is Orpheus, who had wished to return to Hades (10. 38-39, 72-73), and whose story ends happily as he is rejoined to Eurydice (11. 61-66). The stories of *catabasis* were comforting because they provided men with the hope that they, like the heroes, could rise above death and win their way to Elysium.¹⁷ And it is the final philosophical passage that makes Ovid's meaning clear, that shows the meaningfulness of the stories which comprise the bulk of the poem.

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NOTES

¹ E. K. Rand, "Ovid and the Spirit of Metamorphosis" in H. W. Smyth, ed., *Harvard Essays on Classical Subjects* (Cambridge, Mass., 1912) pp. 209-38; Brooks Otis, "Ovid and the Augustans," *TAPhA* 69 (1938) 188-229; Hermann Fränkel, *Ovid: A Poet Between Two Worlds* (Berkeley, 1945).

² Cf. Carlo Pascal, "L'imitazione di Empedocle nelle Metamorfosi di Ovidio" in his *Graecia Capta* (Firenze, 1905); W. C. Stephens, "The Function of Religious and Philosophical Ideas in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*" (diss., microfilm, Princeton, 1957) pp. 47-62.

³ Cf. O. Kern, *Orphicorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1922) frags. 47-53; *Orphic Hymn* 29; Diels-Kranz,

Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., vol. 1, (Berlin, 1951) pp. 15-18 (the gold plates from South Italy).

⁴ W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, 2nd ed. (London, 1952) p. 135.

⁵ Cf. Eduard Norden, *Aeneis Buch VI*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1916) on lines 395 f., p. 238.

⁶ Fränkel (see note 1) p. 219, n. 69.

⁷ *Usus* is a legal term, implying that the property does not belong to the one who uses it. Note the word *iuris* at the beginning of the line.

⁸ Marie Desport, *L'incantation virgilienne. Virgile et Orphée* (Bordeaux, 1952) p. 121.

⁹ Orpheus is described as *dis genitus* (10. 89), which in Vergil is a technical term describing those capable of descent to the Underworld (*Aeneid* 6. 131 and 394).

¹⁰ Juno's *catabasis* (4. 432-80) is outside our

subject, although these lines give the fullest description of the Underworld in the poem.

¹¹ Cf. W. C. Stephens, "Two Stoic Heroes in the *Metamorphoses*" in N. I. Herescu, ed., *Ovidiana. Recueil d'études sur Ovide* (Paris, 1958).

¹² E.g., H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Mythology*, 5th ed. (London, 1953) p. 216.

¹³ E. J. and L. Edelstein, *Asclepius*, 2 vols. (Baltimore, 1945) vol. 2, p. 62. I am indebted to this collection of *testimonia* for my references in this paragraph.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 45, n. 80.

¹⁵ J. Carcopino, *La basilique pythagoricienne de la Porte Majeure* (Paris, 1926) p. 139.

¹⁶ L. P. Wilkinson, *Ovid Recalled* (Cambridge, 1955) p. 218.

¹⁷ Ganschinietz, *RE*, s.v. "Katabasis," col. 2370.

Monkey Business

Betsy, a chimpanzee in the Baltimore Zoo, has sold \$1,500 worth of her modernistic finger paintings.

Artis amatores, victum spectatis Apellen,
Zeuxin iam superat prodigiosa manus.
Inquinat insonem pigmentis simia chartam,
Et venit magno picta tabella ferae.
Musarum comites, vigilate: cavete, poetae—
Simia (sic referunt) iam recitare parat.

Crispa in Viatore

Altera nunc Danae spatii per vasta vagatur
Arcaque iactatur fluctibus aetheriis.
Igniferum Crispam rapuit trans moenia mundi
Missile Russorum, quod per inane volat.
A, quam sola cubas, nulla tibi voce sonante
Humana: nullus te, vaga, mulcet herus.
Sarmaticas pro successu mactaris ad aras,
Altera pro dominis Iphigenia cadis.
At tua laus tecum surgens effertur ad astra:
Sidera te accipient, te Cynosura teget.
Assumet caram sponsam te Sirius ipse,
Aeonas degit qui loca sola colens.
Stelliferam iamiam caudam movet ille benigne,
Caelesti fremitu te saluere iubens.

HARRY C. SCHNUR

We See by the Papers

GRAVES H. THOMPSON, EDITOR

ORIGINAL "LAOCOON" RECOVERED?

From the October 14, 1957, issue of Time:

Four and a half centuries have passed since Roman archaeologists uncovered the famed Laocoön sculpture. . . . Placed in the Vatican, the Laocoön group profoundly impressed Michelangelo, and through him shaped the art of the High Renaissance. But even the Vatican experts have long believed that their Laocoön is only a copy of the original. Last week archaeologists the world over were excited by the possibility that the original Laocoön group, done about the time of Christ, had been found.

The discovery was made by a young Italian engineer named Erno Bellante, who was building a road past the town of Sperlonga (pop. 3,000) by the Tyrrhenian Sea. Taking time off from his prosaic work, Amateur Archaeologist Bellante set workmen to digging inside the grotto of Tiberius . . . a 90-ft.-deep cavern hard by the site of Tiberius' famed Villa Spelunca (Cave Villa). Beneath six inches of limy earth, one of Bellante's men struck a marble fragment shaped like the calf of a human leg, about twice life-size. The diggers dug on to more than 400 pieces of polished marble.

Called in to study the find, Giulio Jacopi, director of Rome's Museo del Terme, a top archaeological authority, examined the fragments and made an excited announcement: on some of them he found the Greek inscription, "Done by Agesander, Polydorus, and Athenodorus," the father and sons generally credited with the original Laocoön group. Said Jacopi: "That violently twisted neck . . . that great marble foot . . . the veins on that huge hand . . . the serpent is monstrous . . . I believe it is Laocoön." . . .

Additional news came in an Associated Press dispatch from Rome (Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 30):

An Italian archaeologist believes there is a double jackpot in the little grotto where a shattered statue, believed that of Laocoön, was found. He says the bits and pieces of Greek sculpture are from two marble statues—not one.

Rome's superintendent of antique art, Giulio Jacopi, also says he is convinced the two statues are originals. . . .

"Last week we found an inscription which unfortunately was not complete," he said.

"But it was sufficiently clear to allow us to state that there are two groups of statues in the grotto."

The inscription, Iacopi said, makes it certain one statue shows the mythological monster, Scylla.

The inscription refers to the Latin poet Virgil and reads:

"If the poet Virgil would ever come back to this world he would praise the sculptors and admit that no poem could have described better the cruelty of Scylla and the broken . . ."

At that point the inscription breaks off, destroyed by time. But Iacopi believes it went on to speak of the "broken Laocoön." . . . Iacopi said he is "convinced the two statues are originals." "They are the work of sculptors of the school of Rhodes," he said, "and I have spent 10 years studying the works of Rhodes."

TED WILLIAMS IN LATIN VERSE

The exploits of Ted Williams, amazing Red Sox batsman, frequently arouse baseball fans, especially those in Massachusetts, to extreme emotional reactions. During the past summer Van Johnson, Tufts University Classics professor, reacted in a more unusual and rather Pindaric fashion when he typed this Letter to the Editor, which was printed in the Boston Daily Globe of July 25, 1957:

As a Latin professor, I feel that the time has come to memorialize in a monumental language the deeds of our local and national hero, Ted Williams. Ted's remarkable season with the Red Sox inspired me to compose the following verses.

If my typewriter and your compositor do not strike out, they will mean something like this:

"They praised the past, but said that Ted was old, when he hit the ball hard and surpassed his predecessors with the bat: for he circled all the bases, making three home runs; and look you, to convince the unbelieving, he did it again. Then everyone gave thunderous applause to old Ted."

TED WILLIAMS HITS
THREE HOME RUNS
IN ONE GAME—TWICE

Praeterita laudabant sed
Dixere senem esse Ted,

Cum vehementer pilam icit
 Et claviger priores vicit:
 Nam metas omnes circumivit
 Ac ita domum ter redivit;
 Incredulis ut daret fidem,
 En, iterumque fecit idem.
 Tum tonitralium omnes red-
 Diderunt seni plausum Ted.

This linguistic exploit so tickled the fancy of the editor of the *Des Moines Register* that he ran an editorial on the subject (August 5), reprinting the poem and translation in full and concluding with the comment, "Doesn't sound much like a sports page, but it's monumental, all right—and proper Bostonian." Unfortunately, the editorial was headed *DIDERUNT SENI PLAUSUM TED!*, which necessitated another editorial, as follows:

BE PATIENT WITH US, LATIN SCHOLARS

Oops! A mislaid hyphen misled us in that Latin poem in praise of Ted Williams in an editorial in the *Register* Monday. (Staff Latinists were off seeing the Demons.) . . .

The last line as it stands wasn't so hot for a headline: it should have been "reddiderunt seni plausum Ted."

Somehow, the hyphen on "red-" got lost, and "Diderunt" looked enough like "Dederunt" ("they gave") to fool the headline writer into thinking it a complete word, instead of the stump of "reddiderunt" ("they gave again").

Part of the fun is the utter un-Latinity of the name "Ted" and the problem of finding rhymes for it in Latin. "Sed" ("but") worked all right once, but for the closing couplet, Professor Johnson had to split "reddiderunt" down the middle.

SUPPORT FOR CLASSICAL STUDIES

In the course of one month evidence of wide-spread support of the Classics came in from a variety of sources. The Youngstown (O.) *Vindicator*, prompted by the meeting of the 35th annual Ohio Classical Conference in that city, gave the following editorial boost:

. . . Though Greek and, more recently, Latin have ceased to become required courses in high schools and colleges, they are essential subjects for students who seek knowledge, as well as aptitude, in particular sciences or professions. A large percentage of our English language comes from Latin. . . . It is the best preparedness for the study of English and the modern languages. It is the language to which we turn when new words are needed.

With the general adoption of the functional approach to education, the classics have

come to stand on their own. Students taking Latin are more inclined to find enjoyment and satisfaction in it than their predecessors did under the old formal discipline theory of education. Study of the classics still is a key which unlocks the door to art and culture, and a future scientist studying Latin is not likely to become a robot with a diploma.

A very tangible boost for the Classics was reported in The University Report of the University of North Carolina (September, 1957):

The George L. Paddison Professorship Fund in the Department of Classics has been established at UNC, with the income from approximately a quarter of a million dollars going to accomplish the wishes of the late Mr. Paddison, a member of the Class of 1905. . . .

The residual estate of Mr. Paddison, who died in 1954, has been reckoned at just over \$247,000.

Details of how the funds will be used to achieve the goals set forth by Mr. Paddison will be worked out some time this Fall by Dr. B. L. Ullman, head of the Department of Classics, in consultation with other University officials.

The will stipulates that income will be used to supplement the state-appropriated salaries of distinguished professors. The professorships so supplemented will be known as the George L. Paddison Professorships.

George Lucas Paddison . . . majored in chemistry in the University. . . . He was a versatile man, a Phi Beta Kappa student, a teacher of chemistry, a lawyer, farmer, and salesman. He was a bachelor. For 37 years he was the regional representative of the West Publishing Company (publishers of law books) of St. Paul, Minnesota. . . .

A Nobel Prize winner credits his intellectual development to the Greeks. The Associated Press reported from Stockholm, October 17:

French author Albert Camus, advocate of the classical Greek philosophy of reason in an angry age, Thursday won the 1957 Nobel Prize for literature.

The Royal Swedish Academy of Literature cited him for "his important literary production, which with clear-sighted earnestness illuminates the problems of the human conscience in our times." . . .

Camus said he was "formed intellectually by the Greeks." He believes in the "Greek classical restraint against the physical or moral 'hangmen' of the extreme left and right." . . .

BOOK REVIEWS

FRED W. HOUSEHOLDER, JR., EDITOR

La Notion du divin depuis Homère jusqu'à Platon. (Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, Tome 1) Vandoeuvers, Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1954. Pp. 308.

THIS IS A SERIES of seven lectures, together with the frequently lively discussion that followed each talk, presented at the first "entretiens sur l'antiquité classique" organized by the Fondation Hardt at Vandoeuvers near Geneva in September of 1952, and attended by ten scholars from five nations. The admirable examples set by the conference (so far superior to the usual symposium), the interest of the subject, and the quality of the contributions warrant our giving more attention than is usual for collections of papers.

"The concept of god in Greek thought"—few questions so intrigue the layman when he is introduced to Greek civilization, and the classicist himself meets it at every turn. But all too often the subject is left to the casual *obiter dictum* of a scholar bent on other matters or to a generalization from one period or author to the Greeks as a whole, or, worst of all, to some confidently held theory of the progress of man and religion. Here the discussion has been divided among various specialists; this has the obvious virtue of postponing the tempting generalization, and the danger that the specialists will not be talking about the same thing may prove a positive advantage, for in fact our sources do not permit us to follow the same level of thinking about the divine all the way from Homer to Plato—often they too are not talking about the same thing, and it is when we forget this that we are most likely to distort the evidence or to be baffled by irreconcilable conflicts.

The virtues of this approach can hardly apply to an introductory lecture by H. J. Rose which tries in a few pages to indicate overall problems and their solutions, e.g., his notion of a social dichotomy (seen as primarily economic) in Greek religious thought between the upper and lower orders, the enlightened aristocrat of leisure and means, and the less intelligent poor ("It seems to be natural for the less intelligent dwellers by the Mediterranean to be polytheists and worshippers of powers close at hand . . ." [p. 23]). Social considerations are unquestionably of enormous significance

for the history of religion but here we seem to have an over-simplification which, based on our own cultural environment (not excepting the *mana* ascribed to backward natives), explains very little. An unrehearsed summation to go with Rose's frequently acute comments on detailed points in discussion might have been more rewarding.

Pierre Chantraine's treatment of the divine in Homer is an excellent, sober analysis. He uses his special linguistic competence to illuminate where the evidence is strong but to insist on our uncertainty where that is required. His discussion may be summarized under these headings: the term *daímo-n*, the anthropomorphic gods, and the positive role of Zeus and the gods in general with regard to human morality and fate. *Daímo-n* usually refers to the undifferentiated or unidentified divine and its predominance in speeches indicates a usage drawn from life. One cannot raise the question of the historical priority of *daímōnes* and the personal gods—they are on two different levels of thought. The "heavenly" connections of the Greek gods as a whole go back to their Indo-European origins and this is especially clear with Zeus and the adoration of the bright sky; into this conception of the gods are admitted figures of diverse origin including the personification of natural forces and of abstract ideas. Their fully human form and personal qualities and the avoidance of the animal, the monstrous, and the magical are striking characteristics of the Olympian gods, and a great step towards a rational approach. Nonetheless in their relations to one another and to man they are essentially amoral. It is with the role of Zeus as *Zeus patér*, exercising patriarchal authority and reflecting perhaps something of the Mycenaean king's position that we find divine support for the family, oaths, guests and suppliants, and, at times, of human justice. Zeus, the gods, or Fate (*moira*, *móros*, *aisa*—basically "man's lot") are the source of the overall plan of events, and possible inconsistency between a personal Zeus and impersonal *moira* is not fully resolved. The *Odyssey*, with a closer connection between the gods and morality, shows a later stage in the evolution of moral thought.

Chantraine rather underestimates the literary, "fictional" elements in the representation of the divine. Whereas the use of

daímon, Zeus *patér*, *moira*, etc., seem to correspond to genuine conventional belief, the more anthropomorphic and scandalous representations of the gods are largely the result of the bardic imagination working in the tradition of heroic epic whose protagonist is man. Thus a conflict between Zeus and *moira* only arises in a fictional situation when Zeus is a character in a story. Again the religious and moral differences between the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad* have much to do with the differences between saga and *märchen* (heroic epic and fairy tale), as Rose reminds us in the discussion. This is not to relegate the literary aspects to convention and the poet's convenience while we rescue them from the precincts of "sacred story." The importance of myth as artistic imagination, both for the individual shaper of myth and the society that receives it, is too easily slighted, perhaps because discussion leads so often to the fantastic.

Hesiod, according to Bruno Snell, contrasts with Homer in his attempt to encompass all the divine, the world as it really is: the dark, the primitive and monstrous, as well as the light (he compares the contrasting approach of a Thucydides and a Herodotus). The wider realm of the manifestation of the divine—everything being "full of gods"—leads to a unity of the divine, and, paradoxically, towards philosophy and monotheism. His concern with origins, with *archai*, points in the same direction, and in his pessimistic view of man in the *Works and Days*, the contrast between mortal life and the eternal, between appearance and reality, he also anticipates the philosophers. The manifestations of the divine are abstracted from their natural surroundings and organized into his genealogical and hierarchic systems—rather like a Linnaean system of the gods. Basic to Hesiod's scheme is the control of the world by Zeus, the highest god. This magnification of Zeus at the expense of the other gods is continued by the lyric poets in their emphasis on one god (for Sappho, Aphrodite; for Pindar, Apollo) who is holier, more powerful, and more real—a permanent, pervasive force rather than a momentary manifestation of power.

Snell, always stimulating, is perhaps more convincing in internal analysis of Hesiod, especially on particular passages such as the catalogue of Nereids, *Theog.* 240 ff., than in attempts to show Hesiod's anticipation of philosophic thought. Snell has done much to foster a view of development from a hypothetical primitive state of mind to rational philosophy and monotheism. But what is usually said of the

primitive background amounts to guesswork and the stages beyond are so discontinuous that in seeking for resemblance and continuity we may miss the essence of Hesiod's own viewpoint in the context of his own age and his own form of literature.

With the Pre-Socratics O. Gigon stresses the difficulties in the way of sources and background that prevent a fair estimate of their theology, but he insists on its importance for understanding the context of subsequent ancient theology. From the Milesians up to the Atomists a concern to explain natural phenomena rationally and remove them from the realm of the divine in effect continues the work of the theogonies in developing systems but avoids identifying their essential principles with the divine. In Xenophanes Gigon sees a theological radicalism which leads either to agnosticism or atheism, or back to traditional views and their refinement, starting with Democritus, through a consideration of the *consensus gentium*. Parallel to this approach, which admits but has no necessary place for the traditional divinities in a rational cosmos, is a view of the cosmos as a work of art, implying the existence of a cosmic artisan. Anaxagoras' *noûs* is an active, not a mechanical, principle but he too avoids calling it *theós* (which at once means so many lesser things and, we might add, is predominantly anthropomorphic). In discussion it is agreed that though we know little of the relationship between the philosopher and his society and its cults, philosophical attack was directed against myth, and above all against "Homer," not against cult.

The tragedians are divided between H. D. F. Kitto (Aeschylus and Sophocles) and the late Fernand Chapouthier (Euripides). What is the relationship of the activity of the gods to that of men? asks Kitto. The same action is often presented on two levels, the divine level showing the wider meaning of the action on the human level. "It is the divine background which shows us that a universal (Kitto calls it *Dike* for *Electra* and O. T.) is at work in the particular case." The ever-present prophecies have the same function. For Sophocles the gods "symbolize his conception of an unchanging framework of Law which permeates human life as it does the physical universe." This is moral law but in the *Electra* even closer to natural law, which accounts for the apparent cruelty of the gods in Sophocles (again, especially in the *Electra*). In Aeschylus to the gods' imperfection are added their conflicts, both of which are signs of an imperfect stage along the way towards a civilized develop-

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ment of both man and god, seen most clearly in the *Oresteia*. There is no quarreling between the gods in Sophocles because he has a more static, less "political" view of the world; for him god and man no longer change.

On Aeschylus Kitto should gain a wide measure of agreement, although it is an approach that has recently received an exaggerated assault by the "new primitivism," as we may call it, of Lloyd-Jones and Page which would deny Aeschylus all originality of religious thought.² On Sophocles he is surely right in stressing order and pattern in the workings of the gods, but does he not go too far in calling this *moral and rational law*? It has been said that religion is concerned with "the way things are" rather than "the way things ought to be." Sophocles' truly religious quality is the overpowering realization he brings of the way things are in the universe and the way heroic man may conduct himself in the face of this reality. Each play has its own problems, but unless we are satisfied to see the *O. T.* as showing Oedipus' punishment for his hot temper and Iocasta's punishment for her distrust of oracles, we must grant that the gods here are neither rational nor moral; rather, *they are*.

Euripides' prodigality with ideas raises numerous contradictions. For his intellectual hospitality Chapouthier borrows Gide's phrase "la disponibilité à l'accueil." His paper is an ingenious and sensitive attempt to distinguish the various tendencies: (1) an acceptance of tradition—witness his unstinted use of the *deus ex machina*, his uncritical attitude towards anthropomorphism, his delight in ritual, etc. But (2) his critical spirit is apparent in his attacks on the veracity and morality of myth, and of inductive (not intuitive) prophecy. Finally (3) there is his positive assertion of new aspects of the divine. The first essential attribute of god is justice derived from a sense of juridical equality (*isôte-s*), from a sense of cosmic order (*Phoen.* 535 ff.) and from an innate moral sense in the heart of the individual (Zeus as the *noûs brotôn*, the Erinyes as Orestes' conscience). It is the intimacy of the divine, appearing in the human conscience and as a friend and companion (Hippolytus and Artemis), that brings us to the heart of his religious thought. In contrast to Aeschylus and Sophocles, the divine is not withdrawn but brought closer to man. The way is prepared for the philosopher for whom the problem of god is a matter of individual search. There is much else of value in this paper to increase our sense of loss at the passing of a fine scholar.

The main points of W. J. Verdenius' concluding paper on Plato are as follows: the predicative character of the Greek view of the divine—something is *theós* rather than *theos* being defined as something—helps to explain Plato's attribution of divinity to various manifestations of the Ideas, from the Idea of the Good down through the individual soul. It also explains the contrast with Christianity—the impersonal character of the divine so that "the more divine the less personal," with the Olympian gods, the *daímones*, the individual soul coming at the bottom of the scale in that order. Hence, too, the care shown by such aspects of divinity as the Demiurge (the ordering aspect of cosmic harmony) is a function of its role in giving order to the sensible world; there is no divine love nor concern on the part of divinity for the individual as such, only for the whole. The world of Ideas, in effect, divinity, is self-sufficient. Thus in the progress of man towards divinity the initiative must be man's. But Plato also recognizes the need for mutual cooperation between man and god if man is to move towards god, and hence the place of divine inspiration (as in Socrates' sense of mission) which, however, he treats as he does his

own myths and the Olympian gods with a certain playful irony, with exaggerated skepticism or exaggerated piety. Human responsibility in the struggle towards the divine is threatened by fanaticism and irrational inspiration. Thus there is a constant tension in Plato between the role of man and god.

It might be best to call Verdenius' discussion "a Platonic theology" rather than "Plato's theology" for though he shows very well how the use of certain terms is determined by the limited context of a particular dialogue, he assumes a unitary view of Plato's philosophy—his thinking did not change, and there was a consistent system behind all his writing with the theory of Ideas at all times implicit. But certainly Verdenius' approach illuminates Plato's work as a whole, and perceptively relates Plato to Greek thought in general and makes contrasts with Christianity at those very points where Platonism and Christianity are closest.

It is, however, in the connections with previous Greek thought that we notice a problem which is not fully uncovered in these papers: the Greek conception of the divine is at one time praised as personal, anthropomorphic, and hence rational, and at other times as impersonal, intellectual, and no less rational. Greater consideration of the literary elements, perhaps the chief lack in this book, might be of help here. After Homer we are dealing, to state the obvious, with highly individual and creative thinkers; in what way they are original may often escape us but it is the mark of their originality that they remain for us. It is the background that society provides for their individuality that is most wanting (and little use is made in this book of what we do know of it). But in Homer—a vital part of the background that we do possess—we have at once works of art in a distinctive literary tradition where all action is brought on to the heroic stage, and at the same time, especially in the speeches, a source for popular views. The contrast we find in Homer persists: on one side the humanized, personal gods thrive in lyric poetry, in art, in the *deus ex machina*, in the intimate gods of Euripides, but the philosophers find them too limited by their human scale; on the other side, the impersonal or indeterminate *daimon* and *theos* of the speeches and of the picture of fate blends superficially with the personalizing tendency in the *Theogony*, and in the philosophers departs progressively from the personal to animate a self-sufficient system. It is the very vigor and persistence of Homeric anthropomorphism

which turns Greek philosophy away from the personal and sets up the delicate tension in Plato between the austere, impersonal divinity of his system and the divine personality that helps the religious man in his progress. After the severe criticism of the Homeric gods by Xenophanes, and simultaneously with the criticism of Euripides and Plato, Greek thought turned for refreshment to the wider, vaguer, and more fundamental level of popular religious feeling where the divine has reality without being confined to set, dramatic character and, depending on need and circumstance, ranges from an extraordinary feeling in man to the very order of the universe. Behind the originality of the writers lie the infinite resources of a living "culture religion" (the rather derogatory "inherited conglomerate" of Murray and Dodds). In the end, though Homer and Hesiod "made" the Greek gods, they also destroyed them. The divine broke the confines imposed by them and found its names and forms elsewhere. For long, western culture has known not Greek religion but only Greek mythology and Greek philosophy, however theological.

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NOTES

¹ But Heraclitus, at least, may be an exception. See G. Vlastos, *Philos. Quart.* 2 (1952) 99 f.

² H. Lloyd-Jones, *J.H.S.* 76 (1956) 1 ff.; Denys Page, in his introduction to Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* (Oxford, 1957). The "old primitivism" of Jane Harrison and Gilbert Murray had, at least, some contact with the anthropology of its day, though much of that anthropology and its influence now seems mistaken. The new generation has only the common sense of the university don with which to judge the primitivism it reveals, and, understandably, it falls Aeschylus on every intellectual count.

Gods and Heroes of the Greeks. By H. J. ROSE. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1957. Pp. ix, 202. 10s, 6d.

Gods and Heroes of the Greeks is H. J. Rose's epitome of his *Handbook of Greek Mythology* (London, 1928). "It is not," he insists, "a series of extracts from the larger book, but newly written, and while covering much the same ground as the *Handbook* it omits many of the less important stories and all the apparatus of reference to ancient authors and modern specialist treatises which that contains."

There are actually a good many differences between the larger and the smaller work. For example, in the *Handbook* the career of Herakles is presented in a chapter entitled "The Cycles of Saga," which precedes

the chapter that treats of Theseus ("The Legends of Greek Lands"); these chapters are separated by one dealing with the tale of Troy. In the smaller work the "Cycles of Saga" chapter, including the Herakles and Troy material, follows the chapter which includes the Theseus material ("Sagas"). This is a change for the better if one considers as superior that arrangement of mythological subjects which emphasizes by juxtaposition the contemporaneity of Theseus and Herakles and which accounts for the Older Heroes before sketching the Trojan War. Mr. Rose does not juxtapose his lives of the two heroes, but a tendency to do so and to associate them more closely is clearer here than in the earlier work. The *Handbook* parallels its placement of Herakles and Theseus with an identical placement, or separation, of the Argonautic expedition and the Kalydonian boarhunt. If this creates the suggestion that the boarhunt was later in time, the smaller work dispels it by reversing the placement and adding mention of the Argonauts as including "veterans of the Kalydonian boarhunt."

The abbreviated introduction to *Gods and Heroes*, setting forth only Mr. Rose's method of study, is a decided improvement over the garbled and generally useless summary of myth-theories in the introduction to his larger work.

The method of both works is, of course, the same: to examine the source of the tale and determine, so far as possible, its date and the section of Greek population to which it is due, and to distinguish its class (myth proper, saga or *märchen*). The *Handbook* defines a myth proper as "the result of the working of naïve imagination upon the facts of experience." In *Gods and Heroes* this definition is amplified: "A myth is the result of imaginative reflection, the precursor we may say of scientific curiosity and hypotheses, on striking natural phenomena and still more on the religious beliefs and practices of the people." Sagas are those legends which deal with historical events. *Märchen* are stories whose sole purpose is amusement. The *Iliad*, incidentally, is classed as a saga, while the *Odyssey* comes under the heading of *märchen*. Among other *märchen* are the Helle-Phrixos preliminary to the Argonaut saga and the stories of Psyche, Arion and Sisyphos.

The present work is divided, then, into chapters on myths, sagas, cycles of saga, and *märchen*, concluding with a section on Roman gods (the "Italian Pseudo-mythology" of the *Handbook*). This organization is appropriate and can provide students with a

positive suggestion regarding the systematization of myth-study. As a beginning text for mythology classes the book is academically superior to its closest competitors. As offering "no more than an outline acquaintance with the subject," it is correct, reliable and unexciting. There are no illustrations, charts or genealogical tables; and Mr. Rose persists, rightly to be sure, in directly transliterating Greek proper nouns (e.g., Kalydonia, Kirke, Perithoos). Whether these factors are advantageous or otherwise is largely a matter of individual preference among teachers. The author's comments relevant to anthropology, folk-lore and, to some extent, etymology will certainly be welcomed in most classrooms as provocative both of interest and controversy.

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Tiberius: The Resentful Caesar. By GREGORIO MARANÓN. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce (European Edition published in 1956; in America, 1957). Pp. xi, 234. \$3.75.

WITH THE PUBLICATION of Gregorio Marañón's latest volume, a scholarly work of historical importance is made available to students of Roman history. Though translated from the Spanish, this volume has lost nothing of its original brilliance, and both the style and readability of the work are remarkable when one considers the inevitable pitfalls and intricacies of translation. It would be an unpardonable oversight not to commend the excellence of the translation by Warre Bradley Wells.

Dr. Marañón is not only a scholar of wide reputation, but also a Catholic psychiatrist, a scientist, and a historian. In addition to this, he is a "liberal intellectual essayist" (according to Sir Harold Nicolson) who writes perceptively. His style is both vigorous and charming, and the reader often finds himself fascinated and moved by the author's eloquence of expression, his analysis of human character, his ability to sift truth from fiction, his depth and sensitivity of understanding, and his insight into human psychology. The documentation of this work, i.e., footnotes and bibliography, is also quite thorough; and the classical and modern sources indicated in the research are exhaustive.

In his foreword to this book, Ronald Syme, Camden Professor of Ancient History at Oxford, notes that not all readers will agree with Dr. Marañón's findings, though he adds

that the author "offers something new and much-needed—the resentments of Tiberius as the principal clue to an enigmatic emperor and to a reign that began with fine prospects and terminated in despotism" (p. vii).

The author from the outset makes no claim of writing another biography of Tiberius; rather, his is a study of the famous emperor's resentments and their effect on his personality and character. Thus, this work is more a psychological study than a historical chronicle. Consequently, there is an abundance of Freudian-like diagnosis of a patient, with psychopathological and psychosexual analyses and probings becoming a bit tedious and overdone at times.

Tiberius' resentments, Dr. Marañón believes, were fanned by a congenital unhappiness, sexual and social timidity, family discord, and marital disappointments. After explaining the theory of resentment, the author considers the roots of the emperor's resentment, the furious clash of the Julians and the Claudians prior to Tiberius' succession to the throne of Caesar Augustus, and the types of friends and foes surrounding Tiberius during his reign. Perhaps the most illuminating part of the book is that entitled "The Protagonist," a section which scrutinizes Tiberius' idiosyncrasies, his military qualities, political administration, his concern for discipline, and his skepticism and antipathy.

Apologists for Tiberius, and others who have tended to popularize his reign, will find here a rather stern and unsentimental study of Tiberius, whose rule, as painted by Dr. Marañón, was characterized by hate and dissension, prompted by the very unstable psychological condition and abnormality of the ruler himself. His resentments made him vindictive, and, in the end, he turned against his family, against the populace, in short, against humanity. Driven into "solitude and anguish," he fled to Capri, giving rise to the ugly rumors and stories concerning his conduct there.

Tiberius' life, thus, was one of flight and fear, a dread of living, and a relentless effort to avoid human contact, and, in the words of Tacitus, a strange *urbiphobia*: *plerumque itineribus ambiens patriam et declinans* (Annals 6. 15). "Rarely has history given us a picture of superhuman anguish such as that of this emperor," the author poignantly writes, "prowling like a criminal around the scene of his crimes, without realizing that it was to be found, not in Rome, but in his own lost soul" (p. 215).

After reading a work such as this, one cannot escape the realization that the Ro-

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man way of life, though from the very beginning imitative of the Greek way, had certainly traveled far afield from the "sweetness and light," to quote Matthew Arnold, of Hellenism. As Edith Hamilton so well expresses it in her book *The Echo of Greece* (New York, 1957): "The Romans thought poorly of human nature. It was tolerable only when under strong control. Humanity was evil throughout" (p. 217).

The rule of Tiberius, to be sure, was typical of the Roman way: the way of brute force, of violence, of lust for power. Dr. Marañón writes: "Such was Tiberius' reign of terror, as vile as any of the violence of weak men made proud by power. It was the reign of terror of a resentful man, maintained by informing, which proclaims the arbitrariness of power just as surely as the stench and the livid blotches of a corpse proclaim death" (p. 203).

Certainly, these words echo an important message, one that is as meaningful today as in the past. Dr. Marañón's work, thus, is an exceptional *tour de force* that deserves to reach a wide reading public.

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